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[DEVELOPING] Impacts of Ukraine Invasion Felt Across the Darknet

Written by DarkOwl Content Team on August 26, 2022. Posted in Blog.

Last updated: April 18 18:30 UTC

The DarkOwl team are actively tracking the fallout from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The effects of the kinetic military operation are causing ripples across the global cyber space including critical underground ecosystems across the deep and darknet.

18 April 2022 – 01:12 UTC

DDoSecrets Leaks 222GB of Data from Gazregion Collected by Anonymous Hacktivists

Three different hacktivist groups (Anonymous, nb65, and DepaixPorteur) submitted archives consisting of emails and sensitive corporate files from Gazregion, a Russian supplier specializing in gas pipelines construction with direct support to Gazprom.

There have been numerous claims of attacks against Gazprom since invasion of Ukraine by Anonymous and other cyber offensive groups. nb65 posted to social media they compromised SSK Gazregion on April 3rd with their version of CONTI ransomware.

18 April 2022 – 01:12 UTC

nb65 Claims Attack Against Russian JSC Bank PSCB with CONTI Ransomware

The Hacktivist group, Network Battalion 65 had claimed they successfully attacked JSC Bank PSCB in Russia and successfully encrypted their network with their version of CONTI ransomware.

The group stated they managed to exfiltrated over 1TB of data including financial statements, tokens, tax forms, client information, and sensitive databases before deleting all backups to prevent data and functionality restoration.

The hacktivists further taunted the bank stating how grateful they were the stored so many credentials in Chrome – a browser for which several emergency security patches have been recently released.

We’re very thankful that you store so many credentials in Chrome. Well done. It’s obvious that incident response has started. Good luck getting your data back without us.

15 April 2022 – 21:59 UTC

GhostSec Leaks Data from domain[.]ru Hosting Provider

The Hacktivist group, GhostSec claimed to target Russian internet domain registration provider, domain[.]ru in a cyberattack. The group managed to exfiltrate over 100MB of data including screenshots of sensitive files and excel spreadsheet data.

According to the README file in the data leak, during the breach, GhostSec identified over 4TB of SQL databases, but in all the excitement the team’s presence was caught by the company’s intrusion detection systems and kicked off the network before the SQL data could be harvested.

15 April 2022 – 17:52 UTC

nb65 Confirms Attack on Continent Express; DDoSecrets Leaks 400 GB of Russian Travel Agency’s Data

The attack on a Russian travel agency occurred several days ago and was shortly after confirmed by the organization. DDoSecrets assisted nb65 in leaking over 400GB of sensitive files and databases from the travel agency. The details of the leak have not been confirmed.

15 April 2022 – 14:32 UTC

Anonymous Takes Over Pro-Russian Discord Accounts

Hacktivists from the Anonymous Collective have successfully taken control of several pro-Russian accounts on the chat platform, Discord, and are now using these accounts to circulate pro-Ukrainian messaging. An Anonymous member @v0g3lsec – who has been extremely active in the #opRussia campaign – shared an image of a hacked account where they posted links and information about the information operations group, squad303 to share truths about the invasion via SMS, WhatsApp, and email with random Russian citizens.

14 April 2022 – 20:02 UTC

DDoSecrets Leaks Unprecedented Amount of Email Data from Russian Organizations

In the last three days, DDoSecrets uploaded archives for five (5) different organizations across Russia totaling 1.97 Million emails and 2 TBs of data.

230,000 emails from the Blagoveshchensk City Administration (Благове́щенск) – 150GB
230,000 emails from the Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation (Министерство культуры Российской Федерации) responsible for state policy regarding art, cinematography, archives, copyright, cultural heritage, and censorship – 446 GB
250,000 emails from the Deptartment of Education of the Strezhevoy (Стрежево́й) City District Administration – 221GB
495,000 emails from the Russian firm Technotec, which has provided oil and gas field services along with chemical reagents used in oil production and transportation – 440GB
768,000 emails from Gazprom Linde Engineering, which specializes in designing gas and petrochemical processing facilities and oil refineries – 728GB

13 April 2022 – 17:09 UTC

CISA Issues Alert About Destructive Malware Targeting US Critical Infrastructure

A joint advisory issued by the Department of Energy (DOE), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the National Security Agency (NSA), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) details how nation state actors (likely sponsored by the Russian government) have demonstrated the capability to gain full system access to multiple industrial control system (ICS) and affiliated supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) devices. The critical alert indicated there is an immediate HIGH cybersecurity risk to critical infrastructure around the US. The devices include:

Schneider Electric programmable logic controllers (PLCs);
OMRON Sysmac NEX PLCs; and
Open Platform Communications Unified Architecture (OPC UA) servers.

For more information read the advisory along with recommended security mitigation measures here: https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-103a

12 April 2022 – 15:31 UTC

ATW | Blue Hornet Announces That They are a “State-Sponsored” Group

The “GOD” account representing AgainstTheWest (APT49) on the new BreachedForums (with many users from the now officially seized RaidForums) announced moments ago that they are indeed a “state-sponsored” cyber group with “direct instructions to infiltrate, attack and leak the country of China, Russia, Iran, North Korea & Belarus.” The group’s Twitter account was also blocked by Russia’s Kremlin account earlier this week and the notification of this block was included in the post.

There is no way to verify the accuracy of the statement posted and it’s unclear whether or not the group will continue their operations in support of Ukraine.

11 April 2022 – TIME UNKNOWN

CONTI Claims Responsibility for Cyberattack Against German Wind Turbine Company

On the 31st of March, Nordex wind turbine manufacturing company in Germany suffered a significant cyberattack. CONTI has claimed responsibility for the attack (over 10 days later) posting the company’s name to their public-facing Tor service of victims. We anticipate that sensitive corporate data will be leaked by the RaaS gang shortly.

11 April 2022 – 20:58 UTC

Anonymous Compromises Regional Government of Tver, Russia; Leaks 130,000 Emails from Governor’s Mail Server

Hacktivists from the Anonymous Collective using the monikers DepaixPorteur and wh1t3sh4d0w0x90 have compromised the domain tverreg[.]ru believed to be associated with the Regional Government of Tver, Russia. Tver is located 110 miles (180km) northwest of Moscow on the banks of the Volga River. The archive is over 116GB in size and consists of over 130,000 emails exfiltrated from Governor Igor Rudenya’s email system dating from 2016 through 2022. The governor was appointed by President Putin in 2016.

Anonymous shared a leak consisting of Russian regional governors on the darknet on 23 March 2022.

11 April 2022 – 14:35 UTC

Finland Suffers Cyberattack; Announces They Will Expedite Application for NATO Membership

On April 8th, the Finnish government confirmed many of its military, defense, and foreign affairs webservers experienced unsophisticated, yet concerted DDoS attacks likely originating from Russian threat actors. The cyberattacks coincidentally occurred just as Ukraine President Zelenskyy started to address the Finnish Parliament on the status of the war in Ukraine around 10:30 GMT.

On the same day, the Finnish Minstry of Defense confirmed, hours earlier, Russia state-owned aircraft also breached Finland’s airspace off Porvoo in the Gulf of Finland – the first time in over 2 years. The aircraft, an Ilyushin IL-96-300 cargo transport airplane, was traveling east to west and landed in Berlin.

Both Finland and Sweden have signaled they will be submitting applications to join NATO. According to open-source reporting, Finland will likely finalize their application during the month of May in time for a NATO summit scheduled in Madrid, Spain in June.

Kremlin spokesman, Dmitry Peskov stated that Russia would have to “rebalance the situation ” with its own measures should Sweden and Finland choose to join NATO.

09 April 2022 – 03:39 UTC

ATW | BH Group Leaks Data Stolen from Russian Temporary Work Agency and Recruitment Firm: Rabotut

AgainstTheWest (Blue Hornet) announced on their Telegram channel they have successfully targeted the domain (rabotut[.]ru) for Rabotut, a “federal scale service” supplier in Russia. According to the threat actor, the archive includes the organization’s entire backend and front end source code, API keys, and SSL keys. According to open-sources, Rabotut is a temporary workers agency and provides contract employees to a number of critical government and corporate businesses around the country.

Contents of leak are in the process of verification by Darkowl analysts.

08 April 2022 – 21:41 UTC

KelvinSecurity Team Targets Russian Cryotcurrency Scam Website: alfa-finrase

KelvinSec released data reportedly from the domain (alfa-finrase[.]com) known for trading in fraud data, e.g. passports, driver’s license, and other sensitve PII. The group claims to have exploited the website, shutdown a cryptocurrency scam, deleted 400GB from the site’s server, and exposed 1.4GB of customer data from the deep web store.

07 April 2022 – 19:30 UTC

DDoSecrets Leaks Over 400,000 Russian Organization Emails Exfiltrated by Anonymous Operations

The leak site, DDoSecrets once again assists Anonymous hactivist collective in distributing sensitive data exfiltrated from companies and organizations in Russia. Three archives were leaked – within minutes of each other – for three organizations: Petrofort, Aerogas, and Forest. The data from these corporate email archives date back over decades of commercial activitiy.

Petrofort: 244GB archive consisting of over 300,000 emails between employees and clients. Petrofort is one of the largest office spaces and business centers in Saint Petersburg.
Aerogas: 145GB archive consisting of over 100,000 emails between employees and clients. Aerogas is an engineering company supporting Russia’s critical oil and gas infrastructure and supports such as: Rosneft, NOVATEK, Volgagaz and Purneft.
Forest (Форест): 35GB archive consisting of over 37,000 emails between employees and clients. Forest is a Russian logging and wood manufacturing company associated with many high-valued construction projects across the company.

A representative from DDoSecrets earlier shared thoughts about the extraordinary volume of leak data coming out of Russia earlier this week in a social media post.

06 April 2022 – 21:42 UTC

Anonymous Claims to Attack Russian MAUK Cinema, Mirkino Belebey

Members of Anonymous using the aliases ShadowS3c and Anonfearless3c have allegedly targeted servers for the Russian cinema and movie theatre, Mirkino Belebey (domain:mirkino-belebey[.]ru). The Mirkino theatre is also known as the MAUK Cinema a.k.a. “World of cinema” in the Belebeevsky District of Russia.

The hacktivists have leaked screenshots with credential data from the breached database containing hundreds of usernames, email adresses, and passwords.

This entry will be updated if/when the leak contents can be confirmed.

06 April 2022 – 20:42 UTC

Hajun Project Identifies Russian Soldiers Who Sent Parcels from Belarus Back to Russia

On April 3rd, the Hajun Project published three hours of surveillance camera footage from a CDEK delivery service located in Mazyr, Belarus. The video shows several soldiers from the Russian Armed Forces sending, among other things, items stolen from Ukrainians, during their “special military operation.”

Using leaked personal data available across the darknet and deepweb, the Hajun Project further confirmed the identities of the Russian military consignors and have released the names and phone numbers for at least 50 of the servicemen that sent parcels around the same time as the published camera video.

The Hajun Project maintains a Telegram channel and Twitter account monitoring and tracking the movement of military land and air assets in Belarus.

05 April 2022 – 16:22 UTC

Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence Agency (GURMO) Conduct SCADA Attacks on Gazprom

Due to the sensitivities of on-going military operations, there is limited detail available on the nature of the attack, but it appears that offensive cyber units under the direction of Main Director of Intelligence for the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine conducted SCADA cyberattacks against Gazprom pipelines. The attacks began within 48 hours of a fire at an oil depot in Russia’s Belgorod region last Friday, that western media reported was the first time Ukrainian helicopters had been spotted going across the border.

The cyberattacks likely triggered an underground gas leak from a highly pressurized gas pipeline in the village of Verkhnevilyuysk; the leak was reported in Russian open sources. Shortly after this, an explosion occurred in a main gas pipeline “Urengoy-Center-2” that civilians captured on Russian social media platform, VK as a large fire occurred in the Lysvensky district of the Kama region near the village of Matveevo.

Over pressurizing gas lines through disrupting infrastructure industrial control systems (ICS) is a documented method for using cyber to cause kinetic damage to pipeline critical infrastructure. The Congressional Research Services detailed such security risks to ICS in their 2021 report.

05 April 2022 – 14:21 UTC

Anonymous Leaks Data from Russian Rations Supplier, Korolevskiy

The company, Korolevskiy (korolevskiy[.].ru) appears to supply Russian companies and organizations with grain, nuts, and confectionaries in addition to rations for the military. This cyberattack could impact the availability of some food ingredient supplies, such as sugar, which is already in short supply and skyrocketing in price across the country due to sanctions.

The data leak includes an 82GB archive containing thousands of emails exfiltrated from the company’s mail servers.

05 April 2022 – 12:29 UTC

nb65 Claims to Hack Civilian Travel Service in Retaliation for Bucha Massacre

Anonymous and hacktivists around the world step up their offensive against Russia after images of Russian soldiers’ war crimes and atrocities against civlians in Bucha emerged on Monday.

Network Battalion 65 (nb65) reportedly targeted Continent Express (continent[.]ru), a Russia-based travel and supply company, with Conti’s ransomware variant in retaliation for the crimes.

Continent Express is one of the largest agencies for travel in Russia and helps arrange tickets and accomodations. As of time of writing the public facing website for continent[.] is operational.

Details of the group’s threatening message posted to social media called out the company’s CEO Stanislav Kostyashkinis in the image below.

“Why, you ask? The answer is simple. We read and watched the coverage of Bucha with horror. The utter lack of humanity in the way Russian soldiers have treated the civilian population of Ukraine left us all in tears. The world has pleased with your country to put an end to this madness drive by the mind of a cowardly tyrant: your president.”

(Update 6 April 2022) Earlier today, Continent Express posted to their news section of the website acknowledging the cyberattack but stated that important data and booking systems were not affected.

04 April 2022 – 12:29 UTC

DDoSecrets Distributes Data Exfiltrated by nb65 From Russian Broadcasting Company

Earlier in the campaign, nb65 leaked a sample of files and emails from All-Russia’s State Television and Broadcasting Company (VGTRK / ВГТРК). The Russian state-owned broadcaster operates five national TV stations, two international networks, five radio stations, and over 80 regional TV and radio networks and has been heralded as essential for the “security of the state.”

According to former VGTRK employees, Kremlin officials have dictated how the news should be covered, and provided incendiary phrases meant to discredit Ukraine. According to the former employees, editors normally have freedom to make decisions, but “where big politics are concerned, war and peace, he has no freedom.”

The 786 GB archive contains over 900,000 emails and 4,000 files spanning 20 years of operations at the broadcaster.

04 April 2022 – 06:24 UTC

Anonymous Leaks List of Russian Soldiers Deployed in Bucha

Anonymous shared a PDF file containing the identities of the members Russia’s 64 Motor Rifle Brigade that was positioned in the Kyiv suburb of Bucha. Since Russia’s withdrawl from the village, the atrocities and war crimes carried out by members of the Brigade have come to light.

The PDF consists of 87 pages detailing the identities of over 1,600 members of the Bridage, including their full name, date of birth, and passport number.

The file most likely originated from the Ukrainian government or intelligence services.

03 April 2022 – 06:16 UTC

Anonymous Shares Data Leaked from Russian Federal Agency for State Property Management

Anonymous shared a single PostGreSQL database, presumably from the domain: rosim.gov.ru, containing over 785MB of logged domain Internet activity available via the domain user: kluser. Much of the data is several years old, including IP addresses, domains, user agents of site vistors. Without further analysis, the value of leaking this data other than psychological operations and information warfare is unclear.

03 April 2022 – 05:07 UTC

nb65 Claims to Compromise Russian Gas Pipeline Supplier: SSK Gazregion

nb65 shared on social media that they have successfully hacked SSK Gazregion LLC (domain: ssk-gaz.ru) – a prominent natural gas pipeline construction company – with an ‘improved’ version of Conti’s ransomware. They taunted the company’s IT department, claiming that they also deleted all backups and restoring services would be an issue for the department.

They also claim to have exfiltrated 110GB of sensitive files, emails, and company data during the operation and trolled the company further stating it took forever to steal the data with the “chincy ass soviet connection” they were using for Internet connectivity.

“Federal Government: This will stop as soon as you cease all activity in Ukraine. Until then, fuck you. Your Preisdent is a coward who sends Russian sons away to die for his own ego. War in Ukraine will gain your country nothing but death and more sanctions. none of your internet facing tech is off limits to us.”

“We won’t stop until you stop.”

03 April 2022 – 04:24 UTC

ATW Release Dox of KILLNET Member

Similar to the personal details shared for various APT cyber groups in China, Russia, and North Korea, ATW targeted the pro-Russian cyber group, KILLNET. They released a dox containing the Russian national’s personal information, his social media, contact information, and familial associations.

KILLNET claimed to launch cyberattacks against Polish government and financial networks in support of Putin’s invasion in Ukraine. Last week, KILLNET also reportedly conducted DDoS attacks against the International Cyber Police agency, CYBERPOL and hacked the ticketing system at Bradley International Airport in Connecticut.

02 April 2022 – 17:28 UTC

Darknet Threat Actor, spectre123 Releases Sensitive Databases for the Indian Government and Military

The threat actor is well-known for targeting governments and defence contractors and has been circulating sensitive government databases for some time. This weekend, they released a “mega leak” of Indian government data for the PM Modi adminsitration’s “turning a blind eye to the humanitarian crisis…. in Ukraine.”

Over 40 GB of data is included in 11 different archived files and includes classified (up to TOP SECRET) and Confidential government documents from the following sectors: ALISDA, DGAQA, MSQAA, DRDO, DDP, Joint Defence Secretary India, BSF, MOD and the Indian Navy.

“The Indian government has a remarkably twisted propensity towards turning a blind eye to the humanitarian crisis in their own nation and now as well in Ukraine. It continues to do business with Russia and refuses to speak on the war, all in an effort to maintain their shallow political interests. These documents have been released to show that there are consequences for taking such foolish decisions.”

02 April 2022 – 06:13 UTC

ATW | BH Claims to Leak Personal Details of Members of Nation State APT Cyber Groups: ATP3, APT40, APT38, & APT28

The AgainstTheWest group continued their offensive against Chinese, North Korean, and Russian nation state cyber groups. Releasing a dox-style text file on Telegram and the deep web forum, breached.co, the ATW group included the names, email addresses, socials and Github accounts, credit card data, front companies, and other identifying information about the group’s participants along with other shocking revelations. Some include:

APT38: China and North Korea have collaboratively had a mole inside the United States Congress since 2011.
APT3: Threat actors are closely aligned with employees from Tencent – the Chinese technological giant behind WeChat and QQ.
APT38/APT3: The alias “ph4nt0m” appears in information for both groups and is believed to be affiliated with APT17 from China.
APT40: Threat actors are randomly connected to employees of ByteDance, the parent company for TikTok.

We are unfortunately unable to corroberate the veracity of the information shared by ATW (Blue Hornet).

01 April 2022 – 20:13 UTC

Anonymous Attacks Russian S-300 Supplier: Lipetsk Mechanical Plant

Anonymous shared another large archive of data stolen from a prominent Russian defense manufacturing facility. The archive is nearly 27GB total and consists of company emails and sensitive documents.

Russia’s “Lipetsk Mechanical Plant” produces several defense products for the Russian military and industrial defense complex. Today, the plant is one of the leading and main manufacturers of modernized self-propelled tractors for S-300V4 anti-aircraft missile systems in Russia. The S-300 is one of Russia’s premier air-defense platforms.

01 April 2022 – 16:00 UTC

Anonymous Leaks Multiple Data Archives From Critical Moscow-Based Organizations

Coordinating today through DDoSecrets on distribution, Anonymous shared several highly significant archives, consisting of over 500GB total of emails, files, and databases from critical Russian organizations with close ties to the Russian government.

Department for Church Charity and Social Service of the Russian Orthodox Church: Database containing 57,500 emails from the Russian Orthodox Church’s charitable wing.
Capital Legal Services: 200,000 emails exfiltrated from a prominent Russian law firm includes an additional 89,000 emails are located in a “Purges” mailbox, consisting largely of bounced email notifications, cron jobs and other server notifications.
Mosekspertiza: Three archives consisting of a) 150,000 emails b) 8,200 files and c) multiple databases totally over 400GB of data. Mosekspertiza is a state-owned company setup by the Moscow Chamber of Commerce to provide expert services and consultations to Russian businesses.

1 April 2022 – 08:56 UTC

GhostSec Wreaks Additional Havoc on Alibaba

After ATW attacked Alibaba Cloud days before, Ghost Security has allegedly hacked and deleted Alibaba’s UAE branch’s ElasticSearch service database. They included a leak to the database extracted from the company on their Telegram channel.

We have also deleted everything and even cleared the backups so there is no recovery, and we left a little celebration from us <3

31 March 2022 – TIME UNKNOWN

German Wind Turbine Company Impacted by Cyberattack

A German-based wind turbine – Nordex – with over $6 billion dollars in global sales faced a cyberattack that incident responders caught “in the early stages.” It’s likely the attack is retaliation for Germany pausing on the Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline deal with Russia.

“Customers, employees, and other stakeholders may be affected by the shutdown of several IT systems. The Nordex Group will provide further updates when more information is available.”

In the early days of the cyberwar, a cyberattack on the satellite communications company Viasat caused 5,800 Enercon wind turbines in Germany to malfunction.

31 March 2022 – 19:43 UTC

Anonymous Leaks 62,000 Emails from Moscow-Based Marathon Group

Anonymous again targets associates of those closest to Putin launching recent cyberattacks against Marathon Group. The Marathon Group is an investment firm owned by Alexander Vinokurov. Vinokurov is the son-in-law of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Larov and is under heavy sanctions by the EU for providing financial support to Russia. The leaked archive is over 51GB in size and is being distributed via DDoSecrets.

31 March 2022 – 14:31 UTC

Ukraine Government Sets Up Website for Whistleblower Reporting

The Ukrainian Prosecutor General’s Office in coordination with the National Agency on Corruption Prevention and Task Force Ukraine deployed the Whistleblower Portal on the Assets of Persons Involved in the Russian Aggression against Ukraine. The website is setup to provide a secure and anonymous method for the submission of tips and evidence of corruption any activities causing national harm. The website will ideally help in the “tracing, freezing, and confisicating of assets of those involved in Russia’s War Crimes.”

Many OSINT sleuths have identified Russian oligarchs’ and government officials’ assets, like super yachets parked in international ports and submitted photographs via posts on social media. This website could be used to officially report supporting information leading to the seizure of those assets or other correlative intelligence obtained through leaks shared by Anonymous.

30 March 2022 – 22:09 UTC

Database Containing the PII of 56 Million Ukrainian Citizens Leaked on Deep Web

A user on the forum breached.co leaked an arhive containing the personal identification information for over 56 Million citizens of Ukraine. The database includes the full name, dates of birth, and address for the individuals. Its unclear the origins of the data. Members of the forum stated it was the Ukrainian Tax Service and could be dated back to 2018.

30 March 2022 – 21:53 UTC

ATW Continues Offensive Against China, Leaks Alibaba Cloud & Ministry of Justice of PRC Data

The AgainstTheWest/Blue Hornet group have ramped up their attacks against Chinese targets and leaked the largest archive they have exfiltrated to date. ATW successfully breached the e-commerce company Alibaba and have dropped a 30GB archive consisting of Alibaba’s cloud endpoint environment, source code, and customer data. They also released a smaller database obtained from the Ministry of Justice of the People’s Republic of China. Both were shared to the deep web forum, breached.co.

30 March 2022 – 19:49 UTC

Anonymous Continues to Encourage SCADA Attacks; Leaks Default Credentials for COTS Hardware Suppliers

Members of the Anonymous Collective circulate spreadsheets and websites containing the default factory credentials for most commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) vendor hardware. Hardware, that in turn, is often affiliated with and successfully exploited via SCADA-based industrial control system (ICS) cyberattacks.

One list includes 138 unique products including manufacturers such as Emerson, General Electric, Hirshmann, and Schneider Electric accompanied with default factory settings such as username: admin and password:default. Another resource is a surface web website (intentionally not included but available upon request) which lists 531 vendors and over 2,100 passwords deployed with hardware from the factory.

Sadly, most companies will rely on the default passwords upon installaton and do not bother with updating to a more robust credential security standard.

30 March 2022 – 18:19 UTC

Anonymous Leaks 5,500 Emails Stolen from Thozis Corporation

Anonymous successfully attacked Thozis Corporation – a Russian investment firm with links to Zakhar Smushkin of St. Petersburg. According to the Panama Papers, the company is registered in the British Virgin Islands. The firm is allegedly involved in one of the largest development projects in Russia, including a project to build a satellite city within St. Petersburg.

The trove of leaked emails likely include sensitive documents and agreements between the Russian government, its societal elite, and other international entites.

DDoSecrets assisted in the publication of the 5.9GB archive obtained by Anonymous.

30 March 2022 – 17:55 UTC

GhostSec Leaks Shambala Casino Network Data

GhostSec claimed a few days ago they had successfully attacked a prominent casino operator in Russia, known as Shambala.

The hacktivist group targeted the casino as they believed members of the Russian government used Russian casinos to move cash into different currencies besides the Ruble. At least 27 computers were reportedly compromised, data exfiltrated, systems locked, and files erased.

29 March 2022 – 06:12 UTC

Russian Aviation Sector Suffer Additional IT Operational Impacts

A post shared on the Russian Telegram channel, Авиаторщина, indicates that the aviation industry of Russia will have additional impacts to their IT support with the withdrawl of the Swiss-based company, SITA as of 29 March.

According to the Telegram post, SITA shutting down their operations will impact numerous systems utilized by the aviation industry and airlines across Russia.

[translated]

“Products for pilots such as AIRCOM Datalink, AIRCOM FlightMessenger, AIRCOM FlightTracker, and AIRCOM Flight Planning services will no longer be available. Such software is utilized by airlines and flight crews to plan, perform aeronautical calculations and track flights, and more accurately calculate remaining fuel, flight time, etc.”

The company – choosing to withdrawl from operating in Russia due to Putin’s invasion – suffered a significant cyberattack on 24 February, the same day as the invasion of Ukraine, resulting in the compromise of passenger data stored on their SITA Passenger Service System (US) Inc. servers. SITA supports numerous international air carriers.

This annoucement comes within days of the cyberattack against Rosaviatsiya (see below), Russia’s Federal Air Transport Authority.

(Update 30 March – 23:42 UTC) No alias associated with Anonymous has claimed credit for the 28 March cyberattacks against Rosaviatsiya which resulted in 65TB of lost agency data. Interestingly, new Anonymous groups have only recently joined the campaign, including RedCult, increasingly the likelihood that widespread industry sector attacks will continue across Russia.

28 March 2022 – 18:23 UTC

nb65 Claims to Hack JSC Mosexpertiza; Steals 450GB of Sensitive Data

In a social media post, nb65 hacktivist group claims they compromised Joint Stock Company (JSC) Mosexpertiza, Moscow’s independent center for expertise and certifications, via the domain mosekspertiza.ru.

They claim they also infected the domain with, none other than Conti’s “crypto-locking ransomware variant” – released earlier this month in the opRussia campaign. In the process of hacking the network nb65 also exfiltrated 450GB of emails, internal documents, and financial data.

28 March 2022 – 17:07 UTC

Anonymous Leaks 140,000 Emails from Russian Oil & Gas Company, MashOil

Distributed via DDoSecrets, the Anonymous hacktivist collective recently targeted MashOil, releasing over 140,000 sensitive corporate emails from the company.

Moscow-based, MashOil manufacturers equipment for hydraulic fracturing and enhanced oil recovery (EOR); injection, nitrogen and cementing equipment; top drive mobile drilling rigs; directional drilling equipment; and, ejector well clean-up.

Anonymous continues to target companies in Russia and any companies that continue to contribute to economic and financial viability for the Russian Federation.

28 March 2022 – 12:41 UTC

Anonymous Leaks Russian Document Ordering Propaganda Video Development

Knowing propaganda is widely circulated by both Ukrainian and Russian affiliated organizations, Anonymous has leaked an official Russian document, titled “On holding informational events on the Internet”, dated 21 March 2022, stating this was an official “order issued” by the Russian government to develop videos to discredit the Ukrainian military and their treatment of prisoners of war (POWs). The order was signed by the “Temporary Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation”, Dmitry Bulgakov and decrees:

Develop and distribute a series of video materials demonstrating the inhuman behavior of the military personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and nationalist formations on the territory of Ukraine in relatinos to prisoners who showed a voluntary desire to surrender
Develop and distribute sermographic materials, evidence of the use of briefings by captured military personnel of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation during the filming
Provide informational support for materials in the comments, the main argument is the violation of the Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners
To impose control over the implmtnation of this order on the head of the Information Warfare and Disguise Department of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation

(UPDATE 29 March 2022 – 20:56 UTC) DarkOwl advises that recent open source intelligence research suggests this letter could be fake and disseminated as part of an information operations campaign. Researchers caught signature mismatches of the Russian official, Bulgakov. Such data is a reality in the the fog of asymmetric warfare.

28 March 2022 – 11:58 UTC

Ukrainian Defense Intelligence Doxxes 620 Russian FSB Agents

The Ukrainian Military Intelligence Agency of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, known simily as Defence Intelligence of Ukraine or GUR, has leaked the identities of over 600 Russian FSB spies. The database includes the agents’ full names, dates of birth, passport numbers, passport dates of issue, registration addresses as well as other identifying markers for the FSB employees.

Many of these agents may be conducting covert operations around the world and leaking their identities may compromise the success of their operations.

28 March 2022 – 11:05 UTC

ATW (BH) Targets Chinese Companys and Government Organizations

After a brief vacation announced on 23 March, the AgainstTheWest (Blue_Hornet) group returns with concerted attacks against a number of Chinese companies and government organizations. The group claims they successfully attacked the following:

The group also referenced a supply-chain software dependency attack, via a poisoned burgeon-r3 NPM package.

Fenglian Technology-Digital Ecological Platform Solution
Bluetopo China security development tool
China Pat Intellectual Property
Weipass
Ministry of Transport China
Freemud Software (supplier to Starbucks)
China Joint Convention Committee.

Shortly after the announcement and initial round of leaks, the group also released source code affiliated with China Guangfa Bank, along with associated Maven releases. The group also claims to have breached the Chinese social messaging platform, weChat.

We are still evaluating the data and determining the specific types of data compromised and released.

28 March 2022 – 03:22 UTC

Russian Federal Air Transport Agency, Rosaviatsiya Confirms CyberAttack; 65TB of Data Erased

The civil aviation agency Rosaviatsiyan responsible for air cargo transportation confirmed with a letter shared on the Russian Telegram channel, Авиаторщина that their website domain favt.ru was offline since Saturday due to a significant cyber attack. The attacks had severely impacted their ability to plan and conduct flight operations and the agency had resorted to pen-and-paper-based operations in the interim.

The notice stated that over 65TB of emails, files and critical documents had been allegedly erased along with the registry of aircraft and aviation personnel. There were no systems backups to restore from because according to the agency spokesperson, the Ministry of Finance had not allocated funds to purchase backups.

“All incoming and outgoing emails for 1.5 years have been lost. We don’t know how to work…”

“The attack occurred due to poor-quality performance of contractual obligations on the part of the company LLC ‘InfAvia’, which carries out the operation of the IT infrastructure of the Federal Air Transport Agency.”

27 March 2022 – 20:44 UTC

Anonymous Leaks 2.4GB of Emails from Russian Construction Company, RostProekt

Over the weekend, DDoSecrets helped Anonymous distribute over 2 gigabytes of sensitive company emails exfiltrated by breaching a prominent Russian construction company, RostProekt (in Russian: РостПроект). The company primarily operates in Russia, with the head office in Moscow Oblast. RostProekt is a primary contributor to Russia’s lumber and other construction materials merchant wholesalers sector. The breach may impact construction projects in the country.

As of time of writing, the website for the company is online.

25 March 2022 – 20:36 UTC

nb65 Leaks Sample Internal Data from the All-Russian State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (VGTRK)

The nb65 hacktivist team targeted and released data affiliated with a state-sponsored propaganda broadcasting company of the Russian Federation, VGTRK. The All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company, also known as Russian Television and Radio (native: Всероссийская государственная телевизионная и радиовещательная компания) owns and operates five national television stations, two international networks, five radio stations, and over 80 regional TV and radio networks. It also runs the information agency Rossiya Segodnya.

nb65 claims they have successfully compromised the organization’s network and exfiltrated over 750GB of data, much of which consists of employee email (.pst) files from the company’s email network. The group claims to be ‘watching’ for their ‘eventual incident response.’

The group continued to troll the organization…

“Your blue team kinda sucks. Hard to find good IT help when all your techies are fleeing the country, eh?”

25 March 2022 – 18:36 UTC

Anonymous Releases Files Exfiltrated from the Central Bank of Russia

Anonymous has released data the hacktivists collected while conducting attacks against the Central Bank of Russia. The archive, broken up into 10 separate parts consists of over 25GB of archived data consisting of over 35,000 files of sensitive bank data. Earlier in the campaign, we observed several posts containing targeting information, e.g. domains, IP addresses, etc for the bank on the deep web.

24 March 2022 – 20:49 UTC

GNG Claims to Hack Russian Mail Server, mail.ru

Georgia’s Society of Hackers (GNG) announced today they successfully attacked Russia’s equivalent to Gmail, mail.ru, including their maps.mail.ru subdomain. The hacktivist group is in process of exfiltrating the data and will provide the detailed data dump in the next few days.

As of time of writing this, the maps.mail.ru website is online and operational.

24 March 2022 – 14:11 UTC

Anonymous Shares Proof of Hacked ATMs in Russia

Earlier today, users at what appears to be a Sberbank ATM reportedly located in Russia experienced technical errors when selecting the Russian language on the screen. Upon selection, the ATM monitor quickly flashes to the Ukrainian flag and the words Glory to Ukraine (Слава Україні!). See the video captured video here.

ATM malware is widely circulated on the darknet and used extensively in the fraud and financial crime communities.

24 March 2022 – 10:43 UTC

Pro-Russian Killnet Launches Anonymous-Style Campaign Against Ukraine – Targets Poland and NATO

The pro-Russian cyber threat actor group, Killnet have been conducting attacks against Ukraine for several weeks and have stepped up their demands and threats against Ukraine and western Europe. Today, they released a video on social media, mirroring the ominous messaging of an Anonymous-style video with the Russian flag in the background. During the video, the group stated they would attack targets in Poland for their assistance to the Ukrainian government during the invasion. They recently also posted specific targeting information for the National Bank of Poland on their Telegram channel.

“…together with the Russian cyber army, we disabled 57 state websites of the Kiev regime, 19 websites of nationalist parties…”

The group also referred to the Colonial Pipeline attack in the US from May 2021.

[translated] “Let’s remember American gas company attack, which resulted in 40% paralyzed infrastructure of America for few days.”

23 March 2022 – 16:45 UTC

AnonGhost Claims to Hack Russian Street Lighting System and Drops Proofs of Access to Moxa Industrial Wireless Networking Infrastructure

AnonGhost known for their attacks against industrial control systems, continued their campaign against Russia by targeting МонтажРегионСтрой г. Рязань street light control system. They stated they successfully shutoff the street lights at 19:35 Moscow time and it was a “gorgeous show.”

Shortly before announcing the breach of the lighting contol panel, AnonGhost also provided proof of access to Moxa (moxa.com) industrial networking devices. They leaked proof of access to router information for a industrial wireless Moxa device, its associated OnCell specifications, along with defacement of the device’s name, description, and login message.

In addition to the proofs they linked to a pastebin file containing over 100 Russian Moxa IP addresses for additional targeting.

It’s unclear where the Moxa device compromise is physically located or whether the Moxa compromise provides direct access to the streetlight control system.

23 March 2022 – 02:44 UTC

BeeHive Cybersecurity Claims They Are Running Ransomware Campaigns Against Russian Targets

When one thought they only hijacked Discord users and trolled pro-Russian ‘hackers’ like @a_lead_1, BeeHive Cybersecurity claims they have been quiet because they are running ransomware operations against targets across Russia.

Oh, in case you guys were curious why we’ve been so quiet. May or may not have a new #ransomware operation running in Ru right now. Alas, we find allies quicker than Putin finds ways to invade Ukraine. We’ll have more details soon but…consider this the public disclosure.

This would not be the first Russia-specific ransomware variant to emerge. According to Trend Micro, RURansom was detected targeting Russian-specific devices with AES-CBC encryption and hard coded salt. Another ransomware variant recently detected, known as “Antiwar” appends the file extension, “putinwillburninhell” to encrypted files.

22 March 2022 – 19:14 UTC

ATW (Blue Hornet) Compromises Russia’s Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring Service with Bitbucket

The AgainstTheWest / Blue Hornet team has recently leaked several internal documents from Russia’s Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring service (spelled by the threat actors as ROSHYDRO). According to open sources, the monitoring service is hosted on the meteorf.ru domain. The data leaks consists of 45 PDF files containing historical software change descriptions and feature requests from the company’s internal software development tracking system. ATW refers to a superadmin account for the GIS FEB RAS Team on Bitbucket in the leak.

21 March 2022 – 22:44 UTC

ATW Returns to Campaign with Attacks Against Almaz-Antey

After a disruption in the ATW team’s cyber activities due to personal issues, the ATW/Blue Hornet team returns leaking a 9GB archive of data allegedly exfiltrated by breaching Almaz-Antey’s corporate networks. The data leak includes employee login data, multiple documents containing PII, confidential and classified intellectual property, schematics, and SQL database files.

Almaz-Antey (Russian: ОАО “Концерн ВКО “Алмаз-Антей”) is one of Russia’s largest defense and arms enterprises, known for the development of Russian anti-aircraft defense systems, cruise missiles, radar systems, artillery shells, and UAVs.

21 March 2022 – 15:26 UTC

Anonymous Targets Russian Software Developer, naumen.ru

Hacktivists from the Anonymous collective have leaked data exfiltrated from Naumen, a software vendor and cloud services provider in Moscow. The company markets itself as “world class IT solutions fully adapted to the Russian market” and lists several prominent international companies as partners. The leaked data consists of an SQL database containing thousands of usernames, email addresses, hashed passwords, and associated PII. The specific purpose and origins of the database from inside Naumen is unclear, but partner companies could experience supply chain / vendor risk issues.

21 March 2022 – 03:27 UTC

KelvinSec Targets Nestle for Continued Commercial Operations in Russia

The KelvinSec ‘hacking’ team have reportedly compromised Nestle in retaliation for continuing to operate and distribute their products in Russia. The group leaked multiple databases from Nestle consisting of customer entity data, orders, payment information, and passwords (10GB total). The group insisted its a “partial” database leak and more data may be released in the future.

Nestle defended its business decision after President Zelenskyy called the company out to protestors on Saturday night in Bern, Switzerland.

(Update 3/22 – 01:48 UTC) Anonymous issues warning and gives a number of US companies 48 hours notice to pull out of Russia or become targets of the #opRussia cyber offensive campaign. Example corporations include: Subway, Chevron, General Mills, Burger King, citrix, and CloudFlare.

20 March 2022 – 23:33 UTC

Anonymous Compromises Russian Social Media VK to Send Message to Millions

Anonymous accesses VK’s messaging platform and sends direct messages to over 12 million Russian users of the social media app. The message, written in Russian, speaks to the realities of the war in Ukraine, the demise of the Russian economy, and threatens that users using the Russian “Z” insignia on as their profile avatar will be targeted by international authorities.

VK users have shared proofs of the message received to confirm the campaign in VK occurred.

20 March 2022 – 15:32 UTC

GhostSec Leaks Military Asset Monitoring System and More from Russian Networks

The leak includes data exfiltrated from a military operational readiness monitoring website (orf-monitor.com), including inventory tracking of key Russian military assets; a leak of a Russian investment company that includes recent Chinese contract data; and lastly, technical data leaks from Russian Defense Contractor Kronshtadt, that includes computational specifications related to their UAVs, along with military operational doctrine, etc.

GhostSec teased on their Telegram channel they had more data coming and this archive they were sharing was a sample of a much bigger dataset.

20 March 2022 – 13:40 UTC

Honest Railworkers in Belarus Help Stop Lines Going to Ukraine

According to open source reporting and the hacktivist group known as Cyber Partisans, the railways going out of Belarus into Ukraine have stopped. Earlier in the campaign, Cyber Partisans disrupted rail operations in Belarus using cyber attacks against ticketing systems and switching systems; however, others report that the rails are inoperable due to “honest railworkers” who do not want to see Belarus military equipment transported into Ukraine for use in this war. (Source)

“I recently appealed to Belarusian railway workers not to carry out criminal orders and not transport Russian military forces in the direction of Ukraine. At the present moment, I can say that there is no railway connection between Ukraine and Belarus. I cannot discuss details, but I am grateful to Belarus’s railway workers for what they are doing” – Oleksandr Kamyshin, director of the Ukrzaliznytsya state railroad

20 March 2022 – 10:28 UTC

Arvin Club Takes Down STORMOUS Ransomware’s Tor Onion Service

Shortly after STORMOUS ransomware gang setup a Tor onion service, the Arvin Club ransomware group compromised their site and leaked SQL databases, information, and performance schemas. It’s unclear whether or not this attack occurred out of STORMOUS’s Russian allegiance or if Arvin merely wanted to teach the cyber criminals a lesson in setting up secure sites on the darknet.

The STORMOUS ransomware group had previously operated only on Telegram.

(UPDATE) As of 3/22 the Tor service is still offline.

20 March 2022 – 02:18 UTC

Anonymous Leaks Database from Russian Aerospace Company Utair

Hacktivists from the Anonymous collective have released the customer database for Russia’s Utair airlines. (Russian: ОАО «Авиакомпания «ЮТэйр»). The JSON database appears to have been collected long before the 2022 #opRussia campaign, as the MongoDB is dated 2019. There are records containing personal data for over 530,000 clients using Utair’s services.

18 March 2022 – 21:29 UTC

nB65 Leaks Data from Russian Space Agency

After a disappointing trolling exercise against Kaspersky, the nb65 hacktivist group returns with data leaks from Russia’s Space Agency, Roscosmos. The group claims they still have persistent access to the agency’s vehicle management system and leaked the IP of the compromised network to prove their access. The leaked data archive consists of over 360MB of user and operations manual, along with solar observatory logs.

Hours earlier, the group also claims to have compromised tensor.ru and leaked 1.6GB of compromised emails for a corporate mailbox for the Russian digital signature company.

18 March 2022 – 15:39 UTC

Russia Targets Ukraine Red Cross Website in Cyber Attack

The Ukrainian Red Cross reported their Internet web servers have been hacked, likely by Pro-Russian cyber threat actors. The website domain – redcross.org.ua – is currently offline with the statement “account disabled by administrator.”

The social media account for the Ukrainian Red Cross stated that no personal data of beneficiaries stored on the website were compromised by the cyber attack.

The Ukrainian Red Cross staff and volunteers are busy and actively providing medical aid and support to vulnerable and wounded Ukrainian civilians across the country as Russian military continue their barrage of cruise missile strikes.

17 March 2022 – 11:43 UTC

AnonGhost Leaks Screenshots of GNSS Satellite Hacks Along with IP Addresses

AnonGhost shared several screenshots as proof of attacks they conducted against Russia’s Trimble GNSS satellite interface. They claimed on social media that other “fake Anonymous” accounts had taken credit for the operation. They also leaked 48 unique IP addresses associated with the GNSS satellite systems. The group did not specify the nature of the attacks against the Russian assets.

17 March 2022 – 09:23 UTC

Anonymous Claims to Have Located Putin’s Bunker

Using OSINT analysis involving satellite imagery and topography and landmark comparisons like rivers and powerplants, the Anonymous community claims they have detected President Putin’s bunker. There no means to verify the accuracy of these assertions.

17 March 2022 – 03:58 UTC

Anonymous Leaks 79 GBs of Emails from R&D Department of Transneft – OMEGA

DDoSecrets released the data on behalf of Anonymous hackers operating in cyber campaigns against Russia. Anonymous compromised email inboxes of OMEGA Company, the R&D arm of Russia’s state-controlled pipeline company known as Transneft [Транснефть]. Transneft is the world’s largest oil pipeline company with over 70,000 kilometres (43,000 miles) of trunk pipelines and transports an estimated 80% of oil and 30% of oil products produced in Russia. The emails cover the accounts’ most recent activity, including after the introduction of US sanctions on February 25, 2022. Some of the emails reflect some of the effects of those sanctions.

16 March 2022 – 10:47 UTC

Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Requests Information via Tor

Russia’s external intelligence agency has issued instructions on how to establish secure communcations via their Virutal Reception System (VRS) to relay any threats to the Russian Federation. The call for leads, found on svr.gov.ru, details how to install the Tor anonymous network, details the v3 .onion address of their secure communications system, and advises the informant using PGP in order to further encrypt the details of any messages provided.

“If you are outside Russia and have important information regarding urgent threats to the security of the Russian Federation, you can safely and anonymously share it with us via the virtual reception system (VRS) of the SVR over the TOR network.”

If you are in hostile environment and/or have reasons to worry about your security, do not use a device (smartphone, computer) registered to you or associated in any way with you or people from your personal settings for network access. Relate the importance of information you want to send us with the security measures you are taking to protect yourself!

15 March 2022 – 11:48 UTC

Pro-Russian Group Xaknet Threatens to Attack Critical Infrastructure Information Centers

“We cannot endlessly give you ‘lessons of politeness.’ We demand the cessation of hacker attacks against Russian infrastructures, we demand the cessation of the activities of information centers for the dissemination of fakes.

In case of refusal, we will be forced to use the most sophisticated methods, and reserve the right to act as the enemy does. Critical information infrastructure facilities will become a priority target for the group. All work will be aimed at the complete destablization of the activities of the aforementioned CIIs.”

It’s unclear from the threats what specific websites or services the cyber threat group considers critical infrastructure information services. The IT Army of Ukraine’s extensive information operations spread across most all social media platforms and information communication mediums across Russia.

15 March 2022 – 07:19 UTC

User on Telegram Leaks New Letter from FSB

A user on pro-Ukrainian Telegram channel (name redacted) has released a new letter, reportedly from an FSB agent, translated into English.

The temperature has really risen here, it’s hot and uncomfortable. I won’t be able to communicate for some time here in the future. I hope we can chat normally again in a few days. There are a lot of things that I have to share with you…
The questions are raised by the FSO (Federal Protective Service of the Russian Federation, aka Putin’s Praetorian Guard) and the DKVR (Russian Military Counterintelligence Department). It is precisely the DKVR that is mounted on horseback and is looking for “moles” and traitors here (FSB) and in the Genstaff (General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation) regarding leaks of Russian column movements in Ukraine. Now the task of each structure is to transfer the fault to others and to make the guilt of others more visible. Almost all members of the FSB are busy with this task at the moment.

The focus is on us more than others at the moment, due to the hellish circumstances regarding the intra-political situation in Ukraine: We (the FSB) have released reports that at least 2,000 trained civilians in every major city of Ukraine were ready to overthrow Zelensky (President of Ukraine). And that at least 5,000 civilians were ready to come out with flags against Zelensky at the call of Russia. You want to laugh ? We (FSB) were supposed to be the judges to crown Ukrainian politicians who were supposed to start tearing each other apart arguing for the right to be called “Russia’s allies.” We even set criteria on how to select the brightest of the most competent (among Ukrainian politicians). Of course, some concerns have been raised about the possibility that we may not be able to attract a large number of people (Ukrainian politicians) to Western Ukraine, to small towns and to Lvov itself. What do we actually have? Berdyansk, Kherson, Mariupol, Kharkiv are the most populated pro-Russian areas (and there is no support for Russia even there). A plan can fall apart, a plan can be wrong. A plan can give a result of 90%, even 50%, or 10%. And that would be a total failure. Here it is 0.0%.

There is also a question: “How did this happen?” This question is actually a (misleading) trap. Because 0.0% is an estimate derived from many years of work by very serious (high-ranking) officials.
And now it turns out that they are either agents of the enemy or simply incomprehensible (according to the FSO / DKVR who are now looking for “moles” within the FSB).

But the question does not end there. If they are so bad, then who appointed them and who controlled their work? It turns out that they are people of the same quality but of a higher rank. And where does this pyramid of responsibilities stop? At the boss (Putin).
And this is where the evil games begin: Our dear Александр Васильевич (Alexander Vasilyevich Bortnikov – Director of the whole FSB) cannot fail to understand how badly he got caught. (Bortnikov realizes the deep mess he is in now)

And our evil spirits from the GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation) and the SVR (Foreign Intelligence Service – equivalent to the CIA) understand everything [and not only from these two organizations]. The situation is so bad that there are no limits to the possible variations (of events that will happen), but something extraordinary is going to happen.”

Shortly after a first letter from an FSB whistleblower surfaced around 5 March, Putin quietly placed his FSB chief, Sergei Beseda and his deputy on house arrest last Sunday. While telling the public he arrested them for embezzlement charges, according to open-source reports, the “real reason is unreliable, incomplete, and partially false information about the political situation in Ukraine” and Putin is holding them responsible for the Ukrainians’ success in the invasion thus far.

14 March 2022 – 12:00 UTC

Russian State Duma of the Federal Assembly Confirms Censorship of VPNs

Citing it was “a difficult task” Alexander Khinshtein, chairman of the State Duma Committee on Information Policy, commented that Russia’s media and propaganda agency, Roskomnadzor has been tasked with blocking over two dozen VPNs [virtual private networks] across Russia. (Source)

We anticipate that number to increase as Putin continues to crack down on Russian citizens’ media consumption.

VPNs have been targeted by Russian authorities since 2017, when an initial VPN law was passed. In 2019 many of the VPN providers across Russia received compliance demands from Roskomnadzor representatives via email – captured in the image below.

The demand for VPNs in the country has reportedly increased by over 2,000% in the last month. Users on Telegram encourage widespread use of anonymity tools like VPNs and Tor, and share links to VPN services still in operation and accessible in the region. Many of the VPNs are available via Telegram directly and offer free trial subscriptions to Russian users.

14 March 2022

Russian Cyber Actors Setup IT Army of Russia Group

The collective of cyber threat actors self identifies as the “IT Army of Russia”, mirroring the IT Army of Ukraine Telegram initiative, and claims it has targeted critical Ukrainian cyber services with DDoS attacks. The group has less than a 100 subscribers and many of the members are affiliated with the Killnet forum.

The group recently posted a detailed dox containing personal information for President Volodymyr Zelenskyy [in Ukrainian: Володимир Олександрович Зеленський]. The dossier contains specific information such as his date of birth, passport number, car registration details, and familial associations.

13 March 2022 – 09:31 UTC

Anonymous Germany Exfiltrates Data from Russian Rosneft Operations in Germany

An Anonymous hacktivist group from Germany, referring to themselves as “AnonLeaks” had access to the networks of Russia’s Rosneft subsidiary in Deutchland for almost two weeks and exfiltrated over 20 terrabytes of corporate data. According to a preliminary review, the data consists of laptop backups, virtual disk images, excel files, work instructions, and other operational information for the refinery.

Anonymous Germany emphasizes they did not have access to critical infrastructure in Germany, nor was the intent of their operation to access critical infrastructure for the refinery or compromise it in any way.

Rosneft is Germany’s third largest petroleum refinery company, processing roughly 12.5 million tons of crude oil per year.

(Update) Details of the leaked data has appeared on a dedicated Tor darknet service setup by the hacktivists.

13 March 2022 – 07:19 UTC

nB65 Claims to Be Jonathan Scott, a US-based Malware Researcher

Since the invasion, a social media account reportedly affiliated with the group nB65 was extremely active in sharing their leaks and targets across Russian networks – including claims of accessing Roscomos Space Agency. Most recently, they stated they had access to Kaspersky’s source code, with many teasers in the hours leading up to a what amassed to a disappointing dump of publicly available code from the Russian antivirus software developer. The group essentially trolled Kaspersky and received heavy criticism from members of the information security research community.

The owner of the group’s Twitter account claimed today they were in real life, Jonathan Scott, a US-based Computer Science PhD student researching mobile spyware and IoT malware. Shortly after, the Twitter account for the group was deleted.

11 March 2022 – 06:25 UTC

GhostSec Claims to Access, Shutdown, and Deface Control Panel of Russian ICS via SCADA Attack

GhostSec continues their offensive against Russian critical infrastructure with attacks affecting industrial controls systems. Today, they claimed they successfully accessed an unknown Russian industrial control system, deface the control panel, and shut the system down. They also stated they deleted the backups to make restoring services more challenging.

They included the screenshot below which appears to correlate to a typical ICS system. The name or location of the network was not identified.

11 March 2022 – 01:34 UTC

BeeHive Cybersecurity Enters Campaign and Targets Pro-Russian Discord Users

A pro-Ukrainian group, known as “BeeHive Cybersecurity” claims to have attacked over 2,700 pro-Russian Discord users, compromising their accounts and defacing their profiles with statements about the realities in Ukraine posted in English, Ukrainian, and Russian.

The group insinuates that they “CnC [command and control] the platforms of the ignorant” and use compromised devices to help combat disinformation.

10 March 2022 – 12:30 UTC

KelvinSec Leaks Private Chats from Darknet Tor Service: Database Market

KelvinSec, a pro-Ukrainian cyber threat actor on the darknet, has leaked 3,178 files containing the private chats from DATABASE Market. DATABSE is a relatively newly-launched service on Tor, where carding and fraud cyber-criminals congregate and transact.

The service is allegedly hosted by IT Resheniya on the IP address 45.155.204.178. KelvinSec reported they infilitrated the market via an insecure direct object reference vulnerability, commonly called “IDOR” which gives an attacker access to the website’s hidden information.

The compromised Tor service is still active as of time of writing.

10 March 2022 – 11:24 UTC

DDoSecrets Leaks Over 800GB of Data from Russian Media Censor, Roskomnadzor

The whistleblower leak site, DDoSecrets has obtained 360,000 files from Роскомнадзор (Roskomnadzor) via hacktivists from the Anonymous campaign against Russia. Roskomnadzor is a Russian state-controlled agency responsible for monitoring, controlling and censoring Russian mass media. The agency is responsible for the recent crackdowns on digital bans of Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. The two part dataset totals over 800 GB including files, emails, and information critical about their operations.

10 March 2022 – 08:35 UTC

GhostSec Hits Hundreds of Printers Across Russia

GhostSec reportedly hacks hundreds of printers across Russia to spread the message about realities in Ukraine. They tagged on to the announcement an obscure 4chan meme, “Hey Russia do you liek mudkipz?” on their Telegram channel. The stated they are targeting Russian government and military networks for the printer exploit.

9 March 2022 – 20:05 UTC

Pro-Russian Group, devilix-EU Joins Campaign Against Ukraine and the US

Late last week, a new Pro-Russian persona appeared on social media and began sharing pro-Russia propaganda, Pro-Trump rhetoric, and counter #opRussia Anonymous content. Over the last five days, they’ve ramped up their attacks claiming to have compromised AWS instances, Microsoft IIS sysstems, and performed BGP hijacking with mentions of several US-based IP addresses.

The group makes further claims that they’re named after their own custom ransomware, “DEVILIX shark.”

DEVILIX named as me is one of the strongest viruses on the world DEVILIX shark is ransomware which can do anything we can create BotNet. where we want. Just a Simple but it’s not.

They most recently shared their thoughts about the cyber war in Russian, declaring that this was not about Ukraine and Russia, but the US and NATO and their intent to keep Russia and Ukraine divided.

Я вижу, что речь идет о двух сторонах, России и Украине. Почему мы разделены из-за политики? Разве вы не видите, что здесь делает Запад и хочет, чтобы мы были разделены. НАТО избежало конфликтов, и теперь привет! Слава России

[Google Translate]

I see that we are talking about two sides, Russia and Ukraine. Why are we divided because of politics? Don’t you see what the West is doing here and wants us to be divided. NATO has avoided conflicts, and now hello! Glory to Russia

8 March 2022 – 21:05 UTC

Anonymous Hacks Hundreds of Russian Security Cameras, Many Affiliated with Russian Government Ministries

Hacktivists from the Anonymous Collective successfully tapped the security camera feeds of hundreds of retail businesses, restaurants, schools, and government installations across Russia. They setup a website to share the leaked camera feeds — all to discover some where critical security offices. Anonymous also defaced security camera displays with the message:

Putin is killing children
352 Ukrainian civilians dead
Russia lied to 200rf.com
Slava Ukraini! Hacked by Anonymous

8 March 2022 – 18:34 UTC

nb65 Group Claims to Have Acquired Kaspersky’s Source Code

After keeping quiet for several days, the group sent out mysterious posts across social media claiming to have accessed Kaspersky source code and found “interesting relationships” in this code.

They also claimed it was “sloppier than Putin’s invasion.”

7 March 2022 – 17:31 UTC

22nd Member of Notorious TrickBot Gang Doxxed

The pro-Ukrainian affiliate of the Trickbot cybercriminal empire has leaked the personal identity of 22 key members of the gang along with private chats between group members. Since the 4th of March, DarkOwl has seen the following aliases mentioned: baget, strix, fire, liam, mushroom, manuel, verto, weldon, zulas, naned, angelo, basil, hector, frog, core, rocco, allen, cypher, flip, dar, and gabr.

7 March 2022 – 13:01 UTC

Digital Cobra Gang Claims 49 “A-Groups” Led by Conti and Cobra Are Attacking America Cyberspace

The Pro-Russian group entered the campaign shortly after Anonymous started #opRussia (28 Feb) with the statement:

“DIGITAL COBRA GANG DCG has officially declared cyber war on hackers who attacking Russia as well and to protect justice”

They’ve given little indication of success, other than inflated claims they have acquired over 92Tb data from US’s military personnel files but no proof has been published.

Earlier today, they posted that members of Conti were helping and 49 “A-team” groups were hacking Amera.

(9 March 2022) – US AWS and Azure cloud platforms have experienced higher than normal traffic on the network but no major disruptions.

7 March 2022 – 06:44 UTC

RedBanditsRU Leaks Russian Electrical Grid Source Code Data

The pro-Russian group, originally assembled to counter-hack Anonymous and cyber actors targeting Russian organizations, posted today that they are leaking the source code Rosseti Centre’s [mrsk-1[.]ru] electrical grid networking infrastructure. Rosseti Centre provides reliable electricity for more than 13 million people in the subjects of the Central Federal District of the Russian Federation.

The group is sharing this information because they believe Putin and his supporters are “leading this country to an apocalypse state.”

DarkOwl warns security researchers opening these archives should always use isolated sandbox environments in the event there is malware and viruses included in the leak.

7 March 2022 – 04:55 UTC

AgainstTheWest (ATW) Returns to the Fight and Drops Multiple Leaks of Russian Corporate Data

In the last 24 hours, ATW dropped URLs for at least 7 leaks corresponding to various Russian technical companies and organizations, reportedly breached by the cybercriminal group. ATW’s participation in the campaign has been controversial as they have had multiple dramatic departures and returns to the campaign and reports of “health issues” of some of the team’s members.

Security researchers reviewing the information from dataleaks last week calls into question the veracity of the information ATW is sharing. Checkpoint released analysis stating that after, “checking their claims deeper reveals that for many of the claims there are no solid proofs apart of very generic screenshots that are allegedly from the breached organizations.”

(Update 7 March 2022 – 18:36 UTC) The group also posted to their Telegram channel that they had successfully breached a Russian cybersecurity company that has been “hording” US-based government data, exposure of multiple SonarQube instances and requested someone get in touch with them immediately. It’s unclear if this is legitimate or just further ego inflation.

6 March 2022

Free Civilian Tor Service Leaks Entire DIIA Contents

Recently, the administrator of Free Civilian shared a post on their Tor service containing the entire Ukraine’s DIIA database of users. They stated the buyer of the database consented to the release, with the understanding some records were deleted. The downloads consist of 60+ archives containing gigabytes of data. The download links have been unstable since DarkOwl discovered them.

The administrator also expressed desire to have the ban on their “Vaticano” Raid Forums account lifted, claiming this leak proved the legitimacy of the information they shared back in January.

Recently, screenshots of an indictment for the alleged seizure of Raid Forums on VeriSign has been in circulation, after users spoke of rifts between pro-Ukrainian users and Russian hackers, potential FBI seizures, and the alleged hijacking the alias of former admin Omnipotent on Darknet World. Prominent users from the forum have setup RF2 and advised any old working Raidforums links are likely phishing logins for the FBI.

6 March 2022 – 18:43 UTC

Anonymous Continues Information Warfare Against Russian Media; Video Services Wink and ivi Stream Anti-War Messaging

After Putin’s overt authoritarian take on media sharing the realities of the war in Ukraine, Anonymous managed to hack Russian video services Wink and ivi to stream pro-Ukrainian messages and video of the conflict.

This weekend, Putin’s parliament passed a “fake-news” law imposing prison sentences for media using the words “war” or “invasion” prompting numerous western outlets to pull their journalists and suspend operation.

6 March 2022 – 15:39 UTC

AnonGhost Enters Campaign and Claims SCADA Attacks Against Multiple Russian Infrastructure Targets

This weekend, AnonGhost entered Anonymous’ #opRussia campaign with a vengence, and claims today they have hacked multiple Russian infrastructure control systems via SCADA attacks and “shut it down.”

They list the following targets:

Волховский РПУ> Volkhov RPU
Бокситогорский РПУ> Boksitogorsk RPU
Лужский РПУ> Luga RPU
Сланцевский РПУ> Slantsevsky RPU
Тихвинский РПУ> Tikhvinsky RPU
Выборгское РПУ> Vyborg RPU

This is after they leaked data from 9 Russian commercial servers hours earlier.

azovkomeks[.]ru
vserver24[.]ru
dvpt[.]ru
ach[.]gov[.]ru
itmo[.]ru
vpmt[.]ru
pvlt[.]ru
hwcompany[.]ru
corbina[.]ru

DarkOwl is in the process of pulling in this data to review and assess the contents of all of the databases.

The AnonGhost group is reportedly one of the more senior anonymous hacktivist teams in the underground, with reporting of the group going back to the early 2010s. According to open-source reporting, AnonGhost was led by Mauritania Attacker. In an online interview with a hacker’s blog in 2013, Mauritania Attacker claimed to be a 25 year old male from Mauritania who started hacking at a young age by joining TeaMp0isoN and ZCompany Hacking Crew (ZHC), two hacking groups known for their attacks of high-profile targets such as NATO, NASA, the UN, and Facebook. (Source)

For those who remember Stuxnet, SCADA type attacks are controversial as there is a fine line between disruption and destruction. Services knocked offline but able to be restored is disruptive and inconvient, causing delays in operation and psychological concern over the safety of such services. However, disruptions that lead to destructive events, e.g. hard disks wiped and unrecoverable, de-railed trains, power plant overheating resulting in explosions, & satellites falling out of the sky are considered serious and may be interpreted as an act of war and result in severe retaliation.

Yesterday, Putin declared western sanctions an act of war and uttered similar threats about hacking satellites earlier this week.

6 March 2022 – 14:52 UTC

GhostSec Returns with Leaks from Russia’s Joint Institute for Nuclear Research (JINR) and Department of Information (DOI) FTP Server Data

Hours ago, an archive consisting of several gigabyte emerged from GhostSec reportedly containing information from Russia’s nuclear research and disinformation activities. GhostSec has been silent for most the last week, perhaps busy with this activity.

According to their website (jinr.ru), the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research is an international intergovernmental organization established through the Convention signed on 26 March 1956 by eleven founding States and registered with the United Nations on 1 February 1957.

As of time of writing, the public facing website is online.

6 March 2022 – 12:34 UTC

Anonymous Dumps Leak of 139 Million Russian Email Addresses

An archive of over 139 Million email addresses, broken up into 15 separate files with mail_ru at the beginning of each file, lists the email addresses for presumed account holders for mail_ru services. VK (VKontakte) assimilated mail.ru email services into its internet services conglomerate in the fall of 2021.

The files included two additional HTML files with ominous warnings – possibly shared on the servers from which these leaks were obtained.

[image translation]

Russian soldiers!
If you think that you are going to an exercise, in fact you are being sent to Ukraine to DIE.

DarkOwl has not determined the veracity of this data, nor confirmed how these emails were obtained; some combolists of this nature are created as an aggregation of other leaked data.

As of time of writing, mail.ru’s public facing website is still online and operational.

5 March 2022 – 20:41 UTC

Anonymous Targets Russian FSB; Letter Appears from Possible FSB Whistleblower

The Federal Security Service (FSB) of the Russian Federation [Федеральная служба безопасности (ФСБ)] is the principal security and intelligence agency of Russia and the main successor agency to the Soviet Union’s KGB.

Earlier today, Anonymous hacktivists targeted the FSB (at the direction of the IT Army Ukraine) and managed to take the external facing website offline. Rumors on social media and chatrooms suggested Anonymous managed to “breach” the FSB’s server.

Shortly after the announcement of the website’s offline status (e.g. #TangoDown) a deep web paste emerged containing a list of 62 subdomains for the fsb.ru domain. This could be for additional targeting and exploitation.

The stability and alliances of members of the FSB are in question by threat intelligence and security researchers across the community. Last night, an alleged FSB whistle-blower letter surfaced (via the founder of http://gulagu.net) that damned Russia’s military performance in Ukraine and predicted a disaster for the RU in the next weeks and months. An English translation of the letter has appeared in the deep web (excerpt below).

To be honest, the Pandora’s box is open – a real global horror will begin by the summer – global famine is inevitable (Russia and Ukraine were the main suppliers of grain in the world, this year’s harvest will be smaller, and logistical problems will bring the catastrophe to a peak point). I can’t tell you what guided those at the top when deciding on the operation, but now they are methodically lowering all the dogs on us (the Service).

We are scolded for analytics – this is very in my profile, so I will explain what is wrong. Recently, we have been increasingly pressed to customize reports to the requirements of management – I once touched on this topic. All these political consultants, politicians and their retinue, influence teams – all this created chaos. Strong. Most importantly, no one knew that there would be such a war, they hid it from everyone.

And here’s an example for you: you are asked (conditionally) to calculate the possibility of human rights protection in different conditions, including the attack of prisons by meteorites. You specify about meteorites, they tell you – this is so, reinsurance for calculations, nothing like this will happen. You understand that the report will be just for show, but you need to write in a victorious style so that there are no questions, they say, why do you have so many problems, did you really work badly. In general, a report is being written that when a meteorite falls, we have everything to eliminate the consequences, we are great, everything is fine.

And you concentrate on tasks that are real – we don’t have enough strength anyway. And then suddenly they really throw meteorites and expect that everything will be according to your analytics, which was written from the bulldozer.

That is why we have a total piz_ets – I don’t even want to pick another word.

5 March 2022 – 16:37 UTC

Anonymous Claims to Breach Yandex (Russia’s Mail and Search Service); Leaks Account Credentials

DarkOwl discovered two leaks shared through the Anonymous hacktivist collective network consisting of over 5.2 Million user accounts’ email addresses and password combinations. We are in the process of analyzing this data leak to determine the veracity of its contents. 1.1 Million Yandex accounts were previously dumped in 2014. Many hackers are using #opRussia to opportunistically claim clout for breaches that did not occur, when in reality they are circulating old previously dumped data and/or verifying accounts by credential stuffing.

5 March 2022 – 15:23 UTC

Paypal Suspends Service in Russia

Paypal announced on LinkedIn they would be halting its operations in Russia; a statement released days after suspending signing up new users on the payment platform on Tuesday. Dan Schulman, CEO wrote:

We remain steadfast in our commitment to bring our unique capabilities and resources to bear to support humanitarian relief to those suffering in Ukraine who desperately need assistance. We will also continue to care for each other as a global employee community during this difficult and consequential time.

On Wednesday, 3 March, the IT Army of Ukraine launched a petition calling for all supporters to sign a petition on change.org:

[TRANSLATION]

While Ukraine protects its people and places, and Russia faces the radical consequences of its war crimes, the most popular payment service via PayPal is still available to the aggressor. This means that it also helps finance the bloody war against Ukraine through PayPal.

We are absolutely sure that modern technologies are a powerful response to tanks, grads and missiles. We call on the company to block its services in Russia via PayPal and launch them in Ukraine, as well as provide an opportunity to raise funds to restore justice and peace in our country and the world.

5 March 2022 – 15:03 UTC

Anonymous Leaks Private RocketChat Conversations from Russian Government Officials

Anonymous is targeting Russia by any means possible and managed to collect private chats between Russian officials on the messaging service, rocket.chat. After review, these chats are different from the ones dropped by @contileaks last week.

The chat includes the network ID, username, and “real name” of 14 members of the chat group. The domain associated with the leak corresponds to the official website of the Russian government and the Governor of the Moscow region.

5 March 2022 – 06:04 UTC

squad303 Sets Up SMS Messaging System to Text Random Russian Citizen Phone Numbers

With the lack of Russian media coverage of the invasion of Ukraine and the intentional misinformation spread by Putin’s disinformation agencies, a pro-Ukraine hacktivist collective, known as squad303 setup an SMS messaging system for citizens around the globe to use to randomly text Russian citizens a scripted message about the nature of world events.

The squad303 team also setup an API for more advanced users.

Update: As of 8AM UTC, 6 March 2022, the service had been used to send over 2 Million texts Russian mobile phone numbers.

The team also reports of suffering from heavy DDoS attacks from pro-Russian cyber actors.

5 March 2022 – 02:34 UTC

Anonymous Hackers Claim to Have Accessed Communication Data for a Russian Military Satellite

After nb65’s reported success accessing Roscosmos earlier this week, it appears that members of the Anonymous collective under the campaign #opRussia have ventured into breaching the communications of Russian military satellite for data collection. The satellite – designated COSMOS 2492 (aka glonass132) is likely active in geospatial intelligence collection over Ukraine for Russia. (note: the original indication of the connection occurred 4 March 2022 @ 09:35 by Anonymous collective member, @shadow_xor.)

DarkOwl also uncovered a leak shared by LulzSec member @shadow_xor titled, “Leak_RUSAT_shadow_xor.zip” which contains significant geopositioning data since the satellite’s launch in 2014. The hacker stated they could not change the coordinates of the satellite, but did capture orbital, passage, and communications data.

Our original reporting on this suggested the hackers were Russian-based, but further analysis only indicated that a number of Russian-based hackers supported the attack on COSMOS 2492.

4 March 2022 – 18:16 UTC

Putin Officially Bans Facebook in Russia

In order to combat the information operations campaign against them online, Putin ordered for ISPs to block Facebook servers and websites across Russia. Security researchers also note an uptick in Russian trolls on social media with bot accounts promoting Putin’s military operations in Ukraine.

Putin’s parliament also passed a law imposing prison terms of up to 15 years for individuals spreading intentionally “fake news” about the military. The terms “invasion” and “war” are no longer allowed in press and media coverage.

Several foreign and Western media outlets, including BBC, CNN, and Bloomberg, have temporarily suspended reporting on the war from Russia.

4 March 2022 – 09:44 UTC

NB65 Teases Information Security Community with Riddles on their Activities

NB65 – the pro-Ukrainian group who claimed responsibility for accessing and shutting down Russia’s spy satellites via SCADA vulnerabilities – teased the information security community that they been quiet cause they were parsing and analyzing numerous vulnerabilities in Russian cyber targets.

If we seem quiet, it’s because we have an olympic sized swimming pool worth of data and vulnerabilities. But here’s some fun that you can participate in…

DarkOwl discovered a post matching the target hidden in the riddle and the content suggests the group has access to RUNNET: Russia’s UNiversity Network.

4 March 2022

IT Army of Ukraine Calls for Volunteers to Support the Internet Forces of Ukraine

Ukraine’s Ministry of Digital Transformation steps up its information warfare against Putin’s propaganda by forming the Internet Forces of Ukraine (ITU). Forming a separate Telegram channel at the start of the month, the channel is dedicated to posting instructions and guidance for citizens around the world that want to aid Ukraine and lack an IT/cybersecurity background.

Друзі, наш ворог, окрім наявної війни у наших містах та селах, веде також інформаційну війну. Не вірте фейкам, не вірте брехні пропаганди путіна – ніякої капітуляції України НЕ БУДЕ!!! У нас потужна армія, ми сильні духом і нас підтримує весь світ! Тому, не ведіться на провокації і вірте в Україну. Поширюйте це серед рідних та близьких у соціальних мережах, щоб вони також не велись на нісенітниці кремля. Ми разом і ми переможемо!!🇺🇦

Friends, our enemy, in addition to the existing war in our cities and villages, is also waging an information war. Do not believe fakes, do not believe the lies of Putin’s propaganda – there will be no capitulation of Ukraine!!! We have a powerful army, we are strong in spirit and we are supported by the whole world! Therefore, do not be fooled by provocations and believe in Ukraine. Spread this to your family and friends on social networks, so that they also do not fall for the Kremlin’s nonsense. We are together and we will win!! 🇺🇦

4 March 2022 – 01:46 UTC

Trickbot Gang Members Doxxed and Links to FSB Confirmed

At 15:00 UTC, before DarkOwl could even finish analyzing the ContiLeaks, a Ukrainian-aligned underground account leaked details of key members of the infamous TrickBot gang. Over the course of the day at a cadence of every 2 hours, dossiers for the individuals appeared on social media. Private chats between members of the gang were included with each of the leaks. 7 male members and their aliases identified: baget, fire, strix, mushroom, manuel, verto, and liam. Twitter has since suspended the account.

3 March 2022 – 20:54 UTC

Russian-Aligned Hackers Target Anonymous Hacktivists in Canada

A pro-Russian cyber group using the name Digital Cobras, claims to have been targeting #opRussia hackers from the Anonymous collective across the US, UK, Greece, and Canada. Earlier today, they posted several names of individuals along with pictures of some of the alleged members of Anonymous.

They also claimed to have “hacked Anonymous’ servers” and downloaded over 260gb of their files and tools. They also claimed to have full access of the administration of Tor Project, including their crypto accounts.

Anonymous does not possess servers or centrally locate their information or tools as it is an organic decentralized collective of hacktivists around the world. Similarly, the Tor Project is run by a network of volunteers.

It is very likely this group is designed to spread disinformation and FUD.

3 March 2022

Size of Zeronet Anonymous Network Increases Since Invasion

In the week since the Putin launched an invasion against the Ukrainian people, DarkOwl has noticed an increase of 385 Zeronet domains in the last week and a near 20% increase in the network’s activity. Zeronet has been historically most heavily used by Chinese threat actors. The trend in “new domain” activity appears to have started on or about February 27th, within hours after the IT Army of Ukraine rallied the underground.

The Tor Project has reported significant increases in the number of unique addresses on Tor on the same day.

3 March 2022 – 17:10 UTC

Anonymous Leaks Database Containing Bank Account Holders Information

bkdr – member of the Anonymous hacktivist collective – released an Excel spreadsheet containing the personal information of over 8,700 business bank account holders in Russia. Full names, passport, DoBs, account standing, etc are included in the file.

3 March 2022 – 15:40 UTC

Pro-Russian Cyber Team, Killnet Claims To Hack Vodafone Services in Ukraine

Killnet, a Pro-Russian organized threat actor has claimed they were successful in attacking Vodafone’s telecommunications services across Ukraine. The group shared links to the vodafone.ua website (as offline) and network graphs proving the website suffered an outage.

The group also claims to have attacked “Anonymous” networks directly, prompting criticism as the Anonymous hacktivist has no central severs or repositories.

[Google Translate]

Cellular communication services under the Vodafone trademark on the territory of Ukraine are provided by the partner of Vodafone Group plc, PRO “VF Ukraine”

⚠ OUR ATTACK WAS REPELLED [REFLECTED] AFTER 4 HOURS.

3 March 2022 – 05:22 UTC

Anonymous Breaches Private Server in Roscosmos and Defaces Website

v0g3lSec – member of the Anonymous hacktivist collective – claims to have infiltrated private servers at the Russian Space Agency, Roscosmos and exfiltrated files from their Luna-Glob moon exploration missions. The archive consists of over 700 MBs. Many of the files are drawings, executables, and technical documents dating back to 2011. A scientific review of the content would be needed to assess the value of the information collected.

In addition the website for the Space Research Institute (IKI) Russian Academy of Sciences (RAN) was also defaced by the same group.

3 March 2022 – 01:11 UTC

Anonymous Leaks Data from Rosatom, Russia’s State Atomic Energy Corporation

According to DarkOwl’s preliminary review of the 74 files, the leak appears to be a mixture of budget data, conference materials, powerpoint presentations, and technical files dating back to 2013. There is random mixture of information included that it is unclear whether this was obtained directly from a breach of the corporation’s servers, an employee at the organization, or collected via OSINT and compiled for use in #opRussia.

“There is no place for dictators in this world. You can’t touch the innocent, Putin. No secret is safe. State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom has been hacked!”

2 March 2022 – 19:55 UTC

ATW Quits Campaign – Cites Conflict with Anonymous, Attribution, and Twitter Suspension

Drama in the group started yesterday with AgainstTheWest claiming Anonymous was taking credit for their successes in the cyber war against Russia. They briefly turned their attention to China announcing several new victims, including the Chinese Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence organization. After their suspension from Twitter earlier today, they announced retirement claiming they had no means for communicating with the public. (Analysts note rebrand to BlueHornet occurred shortly after their announcement)

2 March 2022 – 19:09 UTC

Conti Leak Source Code, Panel, Builder, Decrypter Appear on Darknet Forum

Less than 48 hours after a pro-Ukrainian leaked the infrastructure of the CONTI gang’s operation, including botnet IP addresses and source code executables, users begin circulating the ransomware gang’s critical data across popular darknet forums and discussion boards.

2 March 2022 – 16:35 UTC

Leak Documents Surface Proving War Against Ukraine was Approved on 18 January

Anonymous hackers released photographs of captured documents from Russian troops titled, “WORKING MAP”, and authored by the commander of Russia’s Bomb Battery of the Black Sea Fleet. The maps and documents affirm to the public that the invasion of Ukraine was approved on January 18th with intention to seize the country sometime between 20 February and 06 March 2022. Liveuamap, under intermittent DDoS since this started, confirmed the data.

2 March 2022 – 13:52 UTC

XSS Admin Reports XMPP Jabber Service Ransomed and Heavy DDoS Attacks

A darknet forum popular with the Russian-speaking community has been experiencing technical issues, suffering from Jabber service outages and heavy DDoS attacks. The forum is well known in the darknet for malware discussions and coordination of attacks. The admin shared a post that the jabber service was hit with ransomware and the contents of the chats wiped from the services. They nonchalently suggested users register and continue using the service.

[Translated]

The server didn’t work yesterday. Because of ransom (which, by the way, is prohibited here) we were listed in a spamhouse. Instead of reporting the violation, the “brilliant” spamhouse immediately leafed through us. In principle, for many years I got used to their “adequacy”. I’m not surprised at anything. We have more than 21,000 users, and no one is able to check everyone. To do this, in fact, they came up with feedback contacts (xmpp, e-mail), they are listed everywhere.

Why, I wonder, they don’t block gmail.com ? So many, so to speak, violators of law and order use it, and nothing, for some reason they are not immediately listed.

In parallel with this, a powerful DDoS attack was conducted on us.

Our XMPP project is not commercial, completely free and subsidized. I’ve never understood the point of attacking toads.

At the moment, the functionality has been restored.

An unpleasant moment. Backups according to the law of meanness turned out to be broken. The last one alive was a week ago. Suddenly someone has lost contacts or a toad has disappeared, re-register.

2 March 2022 – 10:33 UTC

Leak Appears with Russian Air Force Officer’s Information

Anonymous leaked another database containing the personal information for over 300,000 of Russia’s military personnel and civilian citizens. The archive, titled “Translated Base Database” contains 35 separate database files containing personal details of the individuals. Information includes: full name, date of birth, age, passport number, address, occupation, etc.

1 March 2022 – 20:46 UTC

Russian Criminal Gang TheRedBanditsRU Recruits on Social Media – Offers Payments for Affiliates

The RedBandits openly recruit “affiliates for certain jobs” stating they did not want white hats, but that they want to “speak to exploit Devloplers, Spammers (phishing skills, vishing etc), Pentesters. We’re building an army!” They incentivize skilled hackers to join their cause for monetary gain, claiming partners would be paid well and to apply directly via qTox.

Earlier today, the group claimed that they did not agree with Putin as a leader nor of his invasion of Ukraine, but will protect him as a citizen of Russia.

“War is good for no one, come, take my hand, make money help your family”

1 March 2022 – 12:57 UTC

STORMOUS Ransomware Group Aligns With Russia

The STORMOUS ransomware group, which has been targeting international victims with their ransomware strain for months, claimed their alliance with the Russian government and threatens greater attacks against Ukraine.

The STORMOUS team has officially announced its support for the Russian governments. And if any party in different parts of the world decides to organize a cyber-attack or cyber-attacks against Russia, we will be in the right direction and will make all our efforts to abandon the supplication of the West, especially the infrastructure. Perhaps the hacking operation that our team carried out for the government of Ukraine and a Ukrainian airline was just a simple operation but what is coming will be bigger.

1 March 2022 – 09:26 UTC

Ukrainian Paper Leaks Personal Data for 120,000 Russian Military Personnel

In an effort to target the Russian soldiers invading Ukraine, the Centre for Defence Strategies in Ukraine has acquired the names and personal data of 120,000 servicemen who are fighting in Ukraine. Ukrainian newspaper, Ukrayinska Pravda has leaked the details of the soldiers which could be one of the biggest information warfare campaigns using doxing mid-military conflict, ever seen.

The doxxed soldiers are likely to face increased engagement on social media and direct phishing attacks.

1 Mar 2022 – 00:38 UTC

NB65 Takes on Russia’s Satellite Technology

nB65 claims that they successfully accessed Russia’s Roscosmos Space Agency and deleted the WS02, ‘rotated’ the credentials and shut down the server. They did not provide any leaks with the social media announcement.

The Russian Space Agency sure does love their satellite imaging. Better yet they sure do love their Vehicle Monitoring System.

Network Battalion isn’t going to give you the IP, that would be too easy, now wouldn’t it? Have a nice Monday fixing your spying tech. Glory to Ukraine.

28 February 2022 – 23:54 UTC

ATW Targets Russia’s Electrical Grid

AgainstTheWest Leaks Information from Russia’s PromEngineering corporation. Archives of corporate emails between employees, clients, vendors, as well as blueprints and engineering documentation for power stations around Russia are included in the leak.

28 February 2022 – 22:00 UTC

CONTI’s Entire Infrastructure Leaked

Does this signal the end of CONTI’s reign as leading RaaS?

Ukrainian aligned affiliate decides to destroy CONTI ransomware gang’s operation by exfiltrating and sharing 141 additional JSON data files of private Jabber chats from 2020, details of their server architecture, their sendmail phishing campaign data information, command and control botnet architecture, and ransomware executables (password protected). Analysis confirms that the gang uses BazarLoader backdoor for installing persistent malware on infected machines.

DarkOwl analysts also noted from leaked Jabber messages that RaaS affiliates were persistent at determining how to evade AV/EDR protection systems like Sophos and Carbon Black. Stating that they had setup sales calls and demos with Carbon Black and Sophos AV providers’ sales teams using proxy companies to gain more information, test the product and attempt to find specifics of the product’s AV/EDR bypass mechanisms.

This reminds us all the importance of vetting and verifying all commercial in-bounds for requests for demos and sales information, especially when it might present an opportunity to learn critical corporate intelligence.

The affiliate leaking the details wrote how this war against their people and Ukraine was breaking their heart.

My comments are coming from the bottom of my heart which is breaking over my dear Ukraine and my people. Looking of what is happening to it breaks my heart and sometimes my heart wants to scream.

28 February 2022 – 21:41 UTC

STORMOUS Ransomware Hits Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine

The Pro-Russian STORMOUS ransomware gang claims to have attacked Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, mfa.gov.ua using their custom ransomware. The group posts victims’ information on their Telegram channel, posting in both English and Arabic. The group stated the Ukraine government network “fragile” and called for DDoS attacks them.

Their network is fragile – their various data has been stolen and distributed according to their phone numbers, email, accounts and national card numbers with an internal network hacked and access to most essential files. This is with placing denial attacks on their main site !

28 February 2022 – 18:00 UTC

China’s Huawei Steps in to Assist Russia with ISP Network Instability

According to Chinese deep web forums, Huawei is reportedly building a mobile broadband in Russia to help with internet outages. As of 26 February, at least 50,000 technical experts will be trained in networking and securty in Russia’s R&D centers.

28 February 2022 – 12:00 UTC

Russian Gas Station Pumps Hacked

Video of disabled electric vehicle (EV) charging stations in Russia surface, displaying error status and the following warning:

”Putin is a dick”, “Glory to Ukraine”, ”Glory to our heroes”,” death to our enemies”

27 February 2022 – 23:06 UTC

Anonymous for Ukraine Leaks Customer Data from Sberbank Russia

While Anonymous leaked the files, the credit for the hack goes to Hacktivist group, Georgia Hackers Society. The two text files (bygng.txt & bankmatbygng.txt) appear to be personal data from the financial institution with the bankmat file containing 4,568 records.

27 February 2022 – 21:00 UTC

CONTI RaaS Suffers for Professing Their Allegiance to the Russian Federation

DarkOwl just discovered 393 JSON files containing private Jabber chats from the ransomware group since January 2021 leaked online. Many of CONTI’s affiliates were displeased with the group’s alliance with Russia.

27 February 2022 – 19:00 UTC

ATW Claims to Take Down CoomingProject Ransomware Group

AgainstTheWest assesses “CoomingProject are actually one of the dumbest “threat” groups online.” AgainstTheWest statement on Twitter:

“RIP CoomingProject. All data on them is being passed to relevant authorities in France.”

27 February 2022 – 16:54 UTC

Cyberpartisans Take Belarusian Railway’s Data-Processing Network Offline

The hacktivist group of cyber specialists located in Belarus managed to force the railway switches to manual control mode, to significantly slow down the movement of trains. The webservers for the railway’s domains (pass.rw.by, portal.rw.by, rw.by) are also offline.

The rail services are being essentially held hostage until Russian troops leave Belarus and there is peace in Ukraine.

27 February 2022 – 11:00 UTC

AgainstTheWest Ransomware Gang Enters the Campaign

AgainstTheWest (ATW) claims to have attacked Russia’s Department of Digital Development and Communications of the Administration of the Pskov Region with their own custom “wiper” malware. All data has been reportedly saved and deleted.

27 February 2022 – 09:00 UTC

Anonymous Attacks Russian Critical Infrastructure

Tvingo Telecom offers fiber-optic networking, internet and satellite services. Tvingo Telecom is a major provider to Russian clients.

27 February 2022 – 00:00 UTC

GhostSec Leaks More Data and Claims Attacks Against Belarusian Cybercriminals, GhostWriter

GhostSec is active in the Anonymous cyber war against Russia and released a sample of databases stolen from additional government and municipality sites across Russia (economy.gov.ru and sudak.rk.gov.ru).

They state on their Telegram channel they have been conducting attacks against “Russian hackers” and the “hacker group GhostWriter” (a.k.a. UNC1151).

26 February 2022 – 18:00 UTC

IT ARMY of Ukraine Now Active on Telegram

A Telegram Channel titled “IT ARMY of Ukraine” appeared earlier today to help coordinate cyber activities against Russia. The channel has already accumulated over 96K followers. Posts are shared in Ukrainian and English containing target server IP addresses and media for mass distribution on social media.

Videos of what events are really happening across Ukraine have appeared on intercepted Russian State Television channels.

В найближчу годину буде одне із найголовніших завдань!

26 February 2022 – 16:00 UTC

Anonymous Hackers Interrupt Russian State Television

Multiple reports across underground chatrooms suggest Russian television was allegedly briefly interrupted to play Ukrainian music and display national images. (Source)

Ukraine’s telecommunications’ agency also announced that Russia’s media regulator’s site was down as well.

26 February 2022 – 09:00 UTC

Russia Restricts Facebook and Twitter to Control Information

Open source internet monitoring reporting organizations discovered Twitter has been blocked by multiple ISPs across Russia. Ukraine’s government is regularly posting on social media to show the Russian people they are still fighting in the invasion. Cybercriminals and hacktivist campaigns also disrupt Russia’s information operations by calling out disinformation bots and taking critical communications sites offline. Twitter has reportedly blocked account registrations from IPs originating in the Russian Federation.

Russia’s state-controlled television station, RT, is still offline.

26 February 2022 – 01:00 UTC

Hackers Leak Data from Belarusian Weapons Manufacturer Tetraedr on the Darknet

Anonymous Liberland and the Pwn-Bär Hack Team announce the start of #OpCyberBullyPutin and leak a two-part archive (200GB total) of confidential employee correspondences from prominent defense contractor and radar manufacturer, Tetraedr in Belarus. The first part is the most recent 1,000 emails from each employee inbox, in .EML format. The second part is a complete archive of each inbox in .PST format.

The hacktivists stated they successfully attacked the company through an unpatched ProxyLogon security vulnerability.

25 February 2022 – 23:30 UTC

Russian Military Radio Frequencies Hijacked

Ukrainian radio frequency (RF) hackers intercepted Russian military numbers stations UVB-76, frequency 4625KHz, and trolled Russia communications by playing Swedish pop group Caramella Girls’ Caramelldansen on top of the radio waves.

The group also successfully intercepted frequencies utilized by Russian strategic bomber planes.

25 February 2022

CoomingProject Ransomware Group Announces Support for Russia

Another ransomware gang sides with Russia officially declaring war against anyone conducting cyber attacks against the Russian government on their Telegram channel.

“Hello everyone this is a message we will help the Russian government if cyber attacks and conduct against Russia”

25 February 2022 – 21:00 UTC

Russia’s Gasprom Energy Corporation Knocked Offline

Headquartered in St. Petersburg, Gasprom (ПАО “Газпром”) is the largest natural gas transmission company in Eastern Russia. The company is mostly owned by the Russian government even though the shares are traded publicly.

The Anonymous hacktivist collective, operating their campaign against Russia via the hashtag #OpRussia, has claimed responsibility.

25 February 2022 – 20:00 UTC

Anonymous Hackers Leak Database for Russia’s Ministry of Defense (MoD)

Russia’s gov.ru and mil.ru website server authentication data, including hundreds of government email addresses and credentials, surface on transient deep web paste sites and Telegram channels. Another leak consisting of 60,000 Russian government email addresses is also now in circulation.

GhostSec, also participating in Anonymous’s cyberwar against Russia, #OpRussia, claimed all subdomains for Russia’s military webservers were offline hours earlier as of 11:00 UTC.

Over around 100+ subdomains for the russian military were hosted on this IP (you may check DNSdumpster for validation) now all downed. In Support of the people in Ukraine WE STAND BY YOU!

25 February 2022

CONTI’s decision to side with Russia has dire consequences for the RaaS Gang

The ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) gang CONTI (a.k.a. CONTI News) has officially sided with the Russian Federation against “Western warmongers” in the conflict.

Many of their affiliate partners are reportedly in disagreement – siding with Ukraine – which became evident once certain private chats were leaked on their internal affiliate platform on social media. It’s uncertain how these political divisions will impact the effectiveness of the ransomware gang’s campaigns. Conti revised their WARNING statement claiming they do “not ally with any government and we condemn the ongoing war.”

25 February 2022 – 16:30 UTC

Hundreds of Russian IP Addresses Appear on Deep Web for Targeting

Over 600 IP addresses correlating to key Russian web services emerge on transient paste sites and underground hacker forums. (Source DarkOwl Vision)

25 February 2022 – 05:00 UTC

Anonymous Threatens to Take Russian Industrial Control Systems Hostage

The hacker group known as Anonymous stepped up its participation in defending Ukrainians through its cyber war with Russia. In an ominous video posted to Twitter, the group called for UN to establish a “neutral security belt” between NATO and Russia to ease tensions. They elevated their influence by threatening to “take hostage industrial control systems” against Russia. Expect Us. We do not forgive. We do not forget.

“If tensions continue to worsen in Ukraine, then we can take hostage… industrial control systems.” Expect us. Operation #Russia Engaged

24 February 2022 – 19:00 UTC

Free Civilian Tor Service Announces 54 New Ukrainian Government Database Leaks

The administrator of the Free Civilian Tor Service – who DarkOwl analysts believe is the Raid Forums threat actor, Vaticano – updated their database leaks service, stating they had confidential data for dozens of Ukrainian government services. DarkOwl analyzed these databases closely and confirmed the threat actor likely exfiltrated the data in December 2021. (Source)

24 February 2022 – 17:00 UTC

Russia’s FSB Warns of Potential Attacks against Critical Infrastructure as a result of Ukraine Operations

The National Coordination Center for Computer Incidents (NCSCI) released an official statement warning citizens of Russia of imminent cyber attacks and for the country to brace for the disruption of important digital information resources and services in response to the on-going special military operation in Ukraine.

“Attacks can be aimed at disrupting the functioning of important information resources and services, causing reputational damage, including for political purposes” – NCSCI

24 February 2022 – 05:00 UTC

Cryptocurrency Markets Crash in Wake of Invasion

Bitcoin cryptocurrency fell below $35,000 USD for the first time since January in reaction to the Russian troops crossing over the Ukraine border. Ethereum fell more than 12% in the last 24 hours.

According to open-source reporting, the collective cryptocurrency market has plummeted over $150 billion dollars in value since the tensions began.

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[DEVELOPING] Darknet Economy Surges Around Abortion Rights

Written by DarkOwl Content Team on July 1, 2022. Posted in Blog.

SCOTUS members credit card information continues to be doxxed

July 1, 2022

The recent doxxing of Supreme Justices – presumably in retribution for the Roe v Wade rulings – has spread widely across social media platforms, including Twitter, Instagram, TikTok, and more.

While all members of the Supreme Court have been doxxed to some degree in the past, this latest round of public information sharing contains Credit Card information for at least four Justices.

Many posts circulating on the darknet, deep web, and paste sites include other associated PII (as pictured above), which together form a comprehensive doxx of the targeted Justices that could be exploited for social engineering attacks, fraud and more.

SIEGEDSEC Targets Pro-Life State Governments

27 June 2022

Over the weekend cyber hacktivists enraged about the SCOTUS decision, decided to direct their anger towards their keyboards and targeted the networks of pro-life state governments, e.g. Kentucky and Arkansas. The group claimed to have accessed and exfiltrated several gigabytes of sensitive data, including employee PII from state government servers. The cyber threat group, SiegedSec, who we featured earlier this month, has been recently emboldened by their involvement in the Russia-Ukraine cyber war and stated on their Telegram channel, the attacks against Kentucky and Arkansas are just the beginning with planned continued attacks against pro-life organizations and states with anti-abortion regulations.

“THE ATTACKS WILL CONTINUE!” – SiegedSec

Source: Telegram

SCOTUS Overturns Roe v. Wade

24 June 2022

On Friday morning, the U.S. Supreme Court uploaded their controversial decision on the case titled, DOBBS, STATE HEALTH OFFICER OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, ET AL. v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION ET AL; a decision which effectively removed one’s constitutional right to an abortion as provided by the long-standing 1973 Roe v. Wade precedent. The decision sparked widespread protests around the country and conflicts between activists and law enforcement.

Original Report

21 June 2022

As a result of the recent political landscape regarding Roe v. Wade, our analysts reviewed the topic of abortion and observed a surge in darknet economies providing abortion medications and home kits on underground marketplaces.

Background and Political Context

The historical January 1973 Roe v. Wade decision by the U.S. Supreme Court, which legally protected one’s rights to an abortion at the Federal level, is on a precipitous demise in a radical shift in political power across the United States. In a draft majority opinion that was leaked out of the Supreme Court to Politico in early May, the conservative majority of the Supreme Court justices are very likely to overturn the landmark Roe v. Wade and a subsequent 1992 decision — Planned Parenthood v. Casey, with Justice ALITO stating, “Roe was egregiously wrong from the start.”

Figure 1: Source POLITICO

If the position of the draft opinion goes ahead as written – which some legal experts predict might be officially published as early as this week – federal protections for one’s right to an abortion will immediately end and the issue will be tossed back for decision at the individual state level. With recent extreme state-legislative decisions such as the Texas Heartbeat Act criminalizing abortions any time after six weeks of pregnancy, 23 states have some form of restrictive abortion-related legislation in place. 19 states have protected the right to abortion by codifying it into their state laws, Colorado and California have established themselves as “sanctuary states” for women’s reproductive health.

According to the American Pregnancy Association, an abortion is defined as the early termination of a pregnancy and is induced by a clinical surgical procedure or the administration of drugs to remove the embryo and placenta from the female’s uterus. Two drugs associated with the “chemical abortion pill regimen” are oral Mifepristone (Mifeprex) and Misoprostol (Cytotec) used in conjunction to stop the production of pregnancy related hormones and induce contractions of the uterus to expel the embryo.

Impacts Seen on the Darknet

Within a week of the Supreme Court’s leaked draft opinion, DarkOwl analysts observed a noticeable volume of information related to medical abortions materialize – including offers for chemical abortion drugs for sale across the darknet.

Chatter on darknet discussion forums and deep-web adjacent chat platforms foster creating an online community to support US-based individuals’ access to abortion, calling it the “Underground Abortion Railroad” to help connect women with abortion and transportation providers and avoid criminal prosecution.

One forum user identified themselves from Europe and offered to stock up on abortion medications and emergency contraception pills such as “Plan B” from their local pharmacies, offering to ship them at fair market price to those in the United States who cannot access them legally through non-darknet sites.

Another user in a popular darknet forum mentioned a reliable marketplace selling Misoprostol, described as “28 Pills 200MG Safe Home Abortion Method.” The vendor of the marketplace commented on the thread that they don’t actually sell the pills anymore because there were not enough buyers, but would be willing to change their position and offer them again if there was demand.

Monitors on the darknet marketplace suggested has yet to offer a “Safe Home Abortion Method Kit” as mentioned in the thread or abortion-related pills on their site. The same vendor also offers a variety of illegal drugs and narcotics as well, including Cocaine, Percocet, Xanax, weight loss treatments, and Freebase.

Figure 2: Source Dread Darknet Discussion Forum

DarkOwl continues to observe other sources of underground abortion services on offer in its Vision database with multiple advertisements for Misoprostol and Mifeprex, and access to (purportedly) safe abortion services. One supplier recommended those in need of abortion pills contact them via XMPP with OMEMO for a direct, private sale.

Another classified-style advertisement describes the at-home abortion treatment in detail and the medications used, with pricing, ranging from $7 to $16 USD for the abortion-related medications. Multiple forms of contact information was also included.

Other drugs offered for sale on the same classified-advertisement forum have been affiliated with scammers that have no intention of providing the services or goods on offer. Tragically, there is increased risk that darknet scammers will exploit the current political abortion issue in the US for financial gain like they did during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Drugs offered for sale on darknet marketplaces

Figure 3: Source DarkOwl Vision

Some darknet forum users point readers to “offshore pharmacy sites” where abortion-related medication could be purchased, mentioning a clinic taking online consultations in India among others. A quick OSINT search revealed numerous Surface Web domains offering abortion-related medications for purchase. How those sites will operate regarding shipping the drugs to customers in states who have banned abortions once Roe is overturned is yet to be determined.

Overall, opinions on the darknet about abortion are mixed with strong opinions on both sides of the issue. Members of right-wing aligned Telegram channels spin abortion as murder and celebrate the Supreme Court’s position.

Figure 4: Source DarkOwl Vision

While other users support less government over individual choices regardless and view the decision as a potential turning point for the loss of other individual rights.

“I do believe everyone should have a choice, it’s a sensitive topic, but I will stand on democracy, taking peoples choices away is not democracy.” – Dread User

Figure 5: Source DarkOwl Vision

A controversial pro-choice group, Ruth Sent Us (RSU), named after late liberal Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, recently admitted to publishing on social media the home addresses of Chief Justice John Roberts alongside five other conservative associate justices: Samuel Alito, Clarence Thomas, Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh and Amy Coney Barrett. The group claimed the information was publicly available and never encouraged violence against any of the justices.

The release of such information has fueled on-going deep web forum debates about the topic with some stating such information releases violates 18 USC 1503, which “prohibits ‘endeavors to influence, intimidate or impede… officers of [the] court’.” Despite the online debate, a 26-year old man, Nicholas John Roske, likely relied on such leaked information to target Justice Kavanaugh last week. Roske was arrested for attempted murder after arriving at Kavanuagh’s home with a Glock 17 handgun, ammunition, a knife, zip ties, pepper spray, and duct tape, that he told police he planned to use to break into Kavanaugh’s house and kill him. Other left-leaning U.S. politicians have also been targeted in their homes since the draft opinion leaks with users on Telegram calling them “pro-abortion death cult democrats.”

Figure 6: Source Telegram

DarkOwl analysts have not yet observed abortion pills such as Mifepristone and Misoprostol widely available on principal decentralized darknet markets, but they are available for purchase via threads in discussion forums, as well as classified-style advertisements on transient paste services.

Closing Thoughts

Users across darknet forums have voiced interest in abortion-related pills and services following the leaked Supreme Court documents and advocate for organized protests in support of and against the potential ruling. Once the U.S. Supreme Court officially issues their ruling, we anticipate a more concerted response from darknet marketplaces in offers for abortion related drugs and services. The darknet will also continue to be a resource for activists to organize political protests and circulate sensitive information related to the abortion debate.

Irrespective of which side of the debate one stands, the darknet will continue to fuel the controversy both in support of and criticism of a woman’s right to abortion. In a world of increased digital surveillance and the fundamental privacy-centric nature of Tor and similar anonymous platforms, individuals will seek out like-minded communities on the darknet for social activism related to the topic. DarkOwl predicts an increased use of Tor to organize political protests and circulate sensitive information related to the abortion debate.

Curious about darknet marketplaces or something you read? Interested in learning more? Contact us to find out how darknet data applies to your use case.

Threat Intelligence RoundUp: September

Written by DarkOwl Content Team on October 1, 2025. Posted in Blog.

October 01, 2025

Our analyst team shares a few articles each week in our email newsletter which goes every Thursday. Make sure to register! This blog highlights those articles in order of what was the most popular in our newsletter – what our readers found the most intriguing. Stay tuned for a recap every month. We hope sharing these resources and news articles emphasizes the importance of cybersecurity and sheds light on the latest in threat intelligence.

1. Hackers breach fintech firm in attempted $130M bank heist – Bleeping Computer

Sinqia, Evertec’s Brazilian subsidiary, disclosed to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that its systems were breached by hackers on August 29, with the intent to conduct unauthorized transactions. The hackers specifically targeted their Brazilian Central Bank real-time payment system, Pix. Access to Pix was gained by the use of stolen credentials belonging to an IT vendor. Evertec has reported that an undisclosed portion of the $130 million has been recovered. No specific hacker group has been linked to the attack. Read full article.

2. Iranian Hackers Exploit 100+ Embassy Email Accounts in Global Phishing Targeting Diplomats – The Hacker News

Dream, the Israeli cybersecurity company, claims an Iranian-nexus group targeted embassies and consulates in Europe via a spear phishing campaign. The emails contained information regarding geopolitical tensions between Iran and Israel, and prompted individuals to open a Word document that “urges recipients to “Enable Content” in order to execute an embedded Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macro, which is responsible for deploying the malware payload. The hackers sent emails to organizations located in the Middle East, Africa, Europe, Asia, and the Americas casting a wide net in an attempt to successfully gain access and harvest information. Article here.

3. Kosovo hacker pleads guilty to running BlackDB cybercrime marketplace – Bleeping Computer

Following extradition from Kosovo in May, Liridon Masurica has pled guilty in a Florida Federal Court. Masurica was the lead administrator of the online criminal marketplace BlackDB.cc from 2018 to 2025. Records show he pled guilty to leading the organization and has also been charged with five counts of fraudulent use of unauthorized access devices and one count of conspiracy to commit access device fraud. Read more here.

4. FBI Issues Flash Alert for UNC6040 and UNC6395 – FBI Flash

On September 12, the FBI “releasing this FLASH to disseminate Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) associated with recent malicious cyber activities by cyber criminal groups UNC6040 and UNC6395”. The alert follows the tracking of UNC6395, which targeted company’s support case information in Salesforce” that occurred from August 8th – 18th. The exfiltrated data was analyzed to extract secrets, credentials, and authentication tokens share din support cases. After discovery, Salesforce was able to revoke all Drift tokens and required customers to reauthenticate the platform. Mandiant disclosed information regarding UNC6040 in June, warning social engineering and vishing attacks connected to Salesforce accounts. Read here.

5. Airport disruptions in Europe caused by a ransomware attack – Bleeping Computer

Several European airports experienced a ransomware attack that affected the check-in and boarding systems. The attack targeted Collins Aerospace, the external provider for both systems. Beginning Friday evening, hackers targeted the MUSE (Multi-User System Environment) system, causing over 100 delayed and cancelled flights throughout the weekend. The attack was confirmed by the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) and the agency claimed the hackers were attempting to lock up data and systems in “an attempt to score a ransom”. All reports claim that the incident was resolved by Monday. Learn more.

6. AI-powered malware hit 2,180 GitHub accounts in “s1ngularity” attack – Bleeping Computer

On August 26, threat actors exploited a flaw GitHub Actions workflow in the Nx repository resulting in the exposure of 2,180 accounts. The telemetry.js malware is a credential stealer that targets Linux and macOS systems. The malware attempted to steal “GitHub tokens, npm tokens, SSH keys, .env files, crypto wallets”. Three separate phases were completed during the attack which led to 7,200 repositories being exposed. Read full article.

7. Massive anti-cybercrime operation leads to over 1,200 arrests in Africa – Bleeping Computer

In an August 22 press release, INTERPOL announced the arrest of 1,209 cybercriminals who targeted nearly 88,000 victims as part of an INTERPOL-coordinated operation dubbed “Operation Serengeti 2.0.” As noted in the statement, the operation took place between June and August 2025 and involved investigators from 18 countries across Africa as well as from the U.K. Nine private sector partners also assisted with the investigation. The operation resulted in the recovery of $97.4 million and the dismantling of 11,432 malicious infrastructures. Read full article.

8. Google nukes 224 Android malware apps behind massive ad fraud campaign – Bleeping Computer

Android ad fraud operation, “SlopAds”, was disrupted following 224 malicious applications on Google Play that generated 2.3 billion ad requests per day. The operation was discovered by HUMAN’s Satori Threat Intelligence team. The applications were downloaded over 30 million times and used obfuscation and steganography to avoid detection. Once detection was avoided “FatModule” malware would be activated. One evasion tactic used by the app was in the way it was downloaded. If installed through the Play Store it acted as a normal app, if installed by clicking through an ad “it downloads four PNG images that utilize steganography to conceal pieces of a malicious APK.” Learn more.

Make sure to register for our weekly newsletter to get access to what our analysts are reading on a weekly basis.

Cyber Security Awareness Month: Upcoming Content

Written by DarkOwl Content Team on October 1, 2025. Posted in Blog.

October 01, 2025

In light of Cybersecurity Awareness month, DarkOwl is committed to sharing research, trends and industry news from our analysts.

Be the first to know as we release new research by entering your email below!

Upcoming Content This Month

BLOG

Threat Intel Round Up: September

EVENT

it-sa Expo & Congress

We will be at it-sa 365, Europe’s largest trade fair for IT security and one of the most important dialogue platforms for IT security solutions. The trade fair covers the entire range of products and services in the field of cybersecurity: hardware, software, training and consulting services as well as Security as a Service. Stop by and meet with us at Booth 9 – 349. Meet us!

WEBINAR

New Regulations & What They Mean for Your Supply Chain

This fireside chat explores challenges and opportunities of incoming regulations impacting cybersecurity in the UK and EU.

Greater digitalization brings with it an avalanche of Third Party integrations and supplier exposure. Rich Hanstock (pwn.legal) and Lindsay Whyte (DarkOwl) explore what new regulations mean for cybersecurity teams, and the change in attitudes required to reassure regulators and customers alike.

Discover how DarkOwl’s DarkSonar helps organizations build a resilient, responsive supply chain security strategy that aligns with Europe’s regulatory future. Register here. Transcription to follow.

BLOG

What is a DDoS Attack?

Cybersecurity might as well have its own language. There are so many acronyms, terms, sayings that cybersecurity professionals and threat actors both use that unless you are deeply knowledgeable, have experience in the security field or have a keen interest, one may not know. Understanding what these acronyms and terms mean is the first step to developing a thorough understanding of cybersecurity and in turn better protecting yourself, clients, and employees.

In this blog series, we aim to explain and simplify some of the most commonly used terms. Previously, we have covered bullet proof hosting, CVEs, APIs, brute force attacks, zero-day exploits, doxing, data harvesting, IoCs, and credential stuffing. In this edition, we dive into DDoS attacks.

WEBINAR

AI vs AI: How Threat Actors and Investigators are Racing for Advantage

AI is transforming investigations, but also transforming adversarial tradecraft. How do we keep pace? From Telegram channels to dark web marketplaces, threat actors are using AI to accelerate crime, propaganda and deception. OSINT Combine and DarkOwl break down what’s happening behind the scenes and how investigators can keep up. Topics of discussion:

Exploration of how cybercriminals and terrorist groups are experimenting with AI technologies
Emerging dark web trends
Overview of AI-augmented investigation techniques
How investigators use AI for data collection
Detecting Disinformation and Synthetic Content
Live collaborative analysis by DarkOwl and OSINT Combine

BLOG

Q3 Product Updates

Stay tuned for our quarterly update blog highlighting new product features and collection stats updates. There is always something exciting coming from our Product and Collections teams and the team is excited to share this round of updates!

BLOG

Cyber Hygiene at Work & Home

In this blog, we will highlight best practices for a safer digital life.

BLOG

Command-and-Control Frameworks – Post Exploitation in Plain Sight

The blog “Indicator of Attack 101” introduces the concept of Indicators of Attack (IoAs), explaining how they differ from Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) and why IoAs are crucial for proactive cyber defense.

BLOG

How Cybercriminals Build Trust in Darknet Marketplaces

Command-and-control (C2) frameworks are used by both red teams and cybercriminals. They provide a wide range of functionality and capabilities that make post-exploitation tactics easier and more effective. In simple terms, a C2 acts as a central server that connects to, communicates with, and manages compromised systems. It establishes persistence and allows the operator to control dozens of infected machines from one central environment.

BLOG

Halloween: Spooky Finds on the Dark Web

The darknet can be a scary place. 👻 For Halloween, we will highlight some spooky findings from our analyst team that they have come across this past year. In the meantime, check out our previous edition where the team uncovered human organs for sale, human meat for sale, and hitmen for hire! Check out last years’ blog here.

Curious to see how darknet data can improve your cybersecurity situational awareness? Contact us.

Ticura and DarkOwl Announce Strategic Partnership to Simplify Dark Web Monitoring

Written by kathy hoffman on September 25, 2025. Posted in Press Releases.

Ticura has partnered with DarkOwl, the industry’s leading provider of darknet data, to revolutionize how organizations monitor for data breaches and dark web threats. This partnership will deliver a streamlined, solution to empower security teams to gain instant visibility into leaked credentials, financial data, and underground chatter. By combining DarkOwl’s vast darknet intelligence database with Ticura’s activation and attribution framework, organizations will be able to monitor and achieve optimal protection to quickly respond to threats.

Monitoring the dark web and clear web to proactively identify leaked credentials, credit card information, and underground chatter is a critical part of cyber defense. For many organizations, and especially security service providers managing dozens or even hundreds of clients, this can be a labor-intensive and complex task. Traditional licensing/selling models often do not align with the needs or economics of smaller organizations.

To address this challenge, Ticura partnered with DarkOwl, to deliver an effortless way to operationalize breach and dark web monitoring. With DarkOwl’s unparalleled dark web intelligence repository—covering millions of darknet sites, forums, and marketplaces—combined with Ticura’s simplified activation and attribution framework, security teams can set up monitoring in minutes instead of weeks.

“Our partnership with Ticura represents a significant step forward in operationalizing darknet intelligence at scale,” said Mark Turnage, DarkOwl CEO. The DarkOwl platform continuously collects and indexes millions of darknet pages, forums, and marketplaces in near real-time. By integrating our data with Ticura’s AI-driven enrichment and attribution engine, we’re enabling security teams to not only detect leaked credentials and sensitive data faster, but also to understand the context—who’s behind it, where it’s spreading, and how it connects to broader threat actor activity. This level of automation and precision is critical for MSSPs and enterprises looking to stay ahead of emerging threats without adding operational overhead.

Our collaboration enables customers to:

Gain immediate visibility into leaked credentials, credit cards, and underground chatter.
Simplify breach and dark web monitoring with easy, automated setup.
Attribute findings with clear context and relevant threat actor connections.
Scale monitoring cost-effectively with transparent, pay-per-asset pricing.

By uniting high-fidelity dark web data with Ticura’s enrichment and explainability, organizations can close intelligence gaps, reduce complexity, and respond decisively to threats before they escalate.

About Ticura

Optimized Cyber Threat Intelligence

ticura is the first AI-powered Threat Intelligence Analytics Service that evaluates the value and efficiency of over 1,100 cyber threat intelligence sources, then optimizes and configures them individually according to customer needs with just a few clicks.

With one of the industry’s most comprehensive real-time threat intelligence repositories, ticura delivers curated threat intelligence, summarized into a single feed at the push of a button, thereby always providing the latest information from all available threat intelligence sources. All sources are continuously measured for quality, enhanced through hundreds of correlations and enrichments, and made actionable and frictionlessly integrated. Learn more at ticura.io.

About DarkOwl

DarkOwl is the industry’s leading provider of darknet data. We offer the world’s largest commercially available database of information collected from the darknet. Using machine learning and human analysts, we automatically, continuously, and anonymously collect and index darknet, deep web, and high-risk surface net data. Our platform collects and stores data in near real-time, allowing darknet sites that frequently change location and availability to be queried in a safe and secure manner without having to access the darknet itself. Customers are able to turn this data into a powerful tool to identify risk at scale and drive better decision making. For more information, contact us.

Dark Web Pharmacy and Illegal PX Medication Sales

Written by DarkOwl Content Team on September 23, 2025. Posted in Blog.

September 23, 2025

Dark web “pharmacies” have become a global black market for prescription medications and counterfeit drugs. These underground vendors operate on hidden parts of the internet, accessible only with special software like Tor, and sell everything from opioid painkillers and anxiety meds to fake pills. Recent international crackdowns have led to hundreds of arrests across multiple continents, showing just how far-reaching and organized this trade has become. By using encryption and anonymous networks, dark web drug sellers connect with buyers around the world while evading traditional law enforcement. This blog looks at where these rogue pharmacies are found and the platforms they use to move drugs outside the law.

Where They are Sold

Darknet Marketplaces

The majority of dark web pharmacy operations take place on multi-vendor marketplaces – hidden websites (with “.onion” addresses) that function like illicit versions of eBay or Amazon. Vendors set up listings for drugs, and buyers browse and purchase through the marketplace. These sites provide built-in escrow payment systems and customer review ratings, which help establish trust between anonymous buyers and sellers. Well-known examples from the past include Silk Road and AlphaBay, and new marketplaces continually arise to replace those shut down by police.

Independent Vendor Sites

Some drug sellers also run their own standalone websites on the dark web. Instead of using a shared marketplace, they maintain a dedicated “storefront” hidden service. For example, one U.S. vendor continued operating a personal darknet website offering several types of illicit pills even after facing initial charges. These independent sites let a vendor control their platform, though attracting customers can be harder without the built-in traffic of a large market. They also lack the escrow protections of major marketplaces, meaning buyers have to trust the vendor directly.

Encrypted Chats and Forums

In addition to Tor websites, a portion of illegal drug trade is arranged in private forums or encrypted messaging apps. Recent threat intelligence reports note a shift toward dealers making direct deals via platforms like Telegram, Signal, or Discord. Vendors advertise in chat groups or forums and then accept orders one-to-one, often taking payment in cryptocurrency. This method helps them reach less tech-savvy buyers (who may not navigate Tor) and avoid the fees or exit scams associated with big darknet markets. However, like independent sites, these direct transactions usually forego escrow – increasing the risk of scams or non-delivery if the buyer isn’t careful.

How They Operate

Sourcing & Production

Supply acquisition

Diverted Rx stock, bulk APIs from overseas brokers, or outright counterfeit precursors; opioids/benzos are common targets.

Counterfeit manufacture

Pill-pressing with dies/logos to mimic pharma tablets (e.g., “Xanax” bars); dosage is inconsistent and unregulated.

Platform & Presence

Channel selection

Multi-vendor marketplaces (escrow, ratings), independent Tor shops, and encrypted chat/closed forums; vendors diversify IDs to hedge takedowns.

Reputation management

Leverage market feedback systems; promote “stealth,” shipping success rates, and refunds to drive buyer trust. (Observed repeatedly in takedown summaries and market analyses.)

Security & Comms

Anonymity stack

Tor access; PGP for messages; crypto payments (BTC; privacy coins like XMR increasingly preferred per EU assessments).

Operational security (OPSEC)

Rotate handles, swap P.O. boxes/mailing points, segment roles (pressing vs. packing vs. posting), and avoid reusing identifiers.

Listings, Sales & Payment

Product listings

Detailed SKU pages (dosage, “brand,” batch claims), pricing tiers, bulk discounts; some offer testing “proofs.”

Escrow & dispute flow

Funds held until delivery confirmation; DM/PGP comms for issues; off-platform direct deals used to avoid fees—higher scam risk.

Fulfillment & “Stealth” Shipping

Packaging

Vacuum sealing, odor barriers, concealment in benign items, innocuous labels/returns; postal systems are the primary vector.

Drop & distribution

Frequent post-office drops.

Cash-out & Continuity

Funds handling

Peel chains, mixers, P2P off-ramps.

Migration & recovery

After market seizures, vendors relist quickly elsewhere under new monikers.

Risk & Authenticity Note (for Rx specifically)

Authenticity is unreliable

A non-trivial share of “pharma” listings are counterfeit or misbranded (e.g., fake alprazolam/oxycodone); several rings pressed millions of pills sold as name-brand meds.

Are Dark Web Pills the Real Thing?

Most pills sold on the dark web are not genuine pharmaceuticals. Law enforcement has caught countless vendors making their own tablets with pill presses, stamping them with real drug logos, and selling them as Xanax, oxycodone, or Adderall. Some are made with raw ingredients shipped from overseas; others are mixed in makeshift labs with no quality control.

The danger is what’s inside: pills advertised as painkillers often contain fentanyl, and fake Adderall tablets have been found packed with meth. Even if a pill looks real, its contents may be wrong, too strong, or contaminated. A single counterfeit dose can be deadly.

Scams are common too—some sellers simply take your money and never ship. Marketplaces use escrow to limit this, but if you buy directly through a website or chat, you’re on your own.

Conclusion

Dark web pharmacies may look like convenient, no-questions-asked sources for prescription drugs, but the reality is far more dangerous. Most pills sold online are counterfeit, misbranded, or laced with powerful substances like fentanyl or meth. Even when products appear legitimate, there is no quality control, no guarantee of safety, and no way for buyers to know what they are really taking.

While these underground vendors rely on encryption, hidden websites, and clever shipping tactics to stay one step ahead, law enforcement has shown that they are not untouchable. Major operations around the world have taken down marketplaces, seized millions of fake pills, and arrested key players. Still, new vendors and sites quickly emerge to replace the old ones.

In the end, buying from a dark web pharmacy is a gamble with high stakes. The risks include wasting money, falling victim to scams, or, most critically, consuming a counterfeit pill that could be deadly. The safest choice remains the obvious one: only use medications prescribed by a doctor and dispensed by a licensed pharmacy.

How Darknet Threat Actors Are Using AI and Why It Matters

Written by DarkOwl Content Team on September 18, 2025. Posted in Blog.

September 18, 2025

Artificial intelligence has quickly become one of the most disruptive forces in cybersecurity. On the surface, AI promises efficiency, smarter defenses, and automation. But it is also being exploited by criminals in underground forums and marketplaces. The darknet has always been a hub for phishing kits, ransomware gangs, and stolen data markets. What has changed is the speed and polish of those attacks. AI has not created new crimes, but it has made the old one’s sharper, more scalable, and harder to defend against.

To understand the risks, you need to look closely at how threat actors are adopting AI in three areas where the damage is already visible: phishing, ransomware, and stealer logs. Alongside that, it’s worth exploring how the darknet economy itself is shifting to a subscription-based model that feels eerily similar to legitimate tech marketplaces.

Phishing Gets Smarter

Phishing is one of the oldest tricks in the book. Traditionally, it relied on blasting out mass emails and hoping a few recipients clicked on malicious links. These campaigns were often riddled with error, bad grammar, odd formatting, and suspicious sender addresses. They worked well enough to snare the unwary, but many were easy to spot.

AI has changed that. In 2023, tools like FraudGPT and WormGPT appeared for sale across darknet forums and Telegram channels. FraudGPT was promoted as a chatbot with “no limitations, no filters, no boundaries.” It promised to help criminals craft polished phishing emails, generate fake websites, and even produce malicious code. Sellers marketed it in the same way a SaaS startup would market legitimate tools, with clear feature lists and monthly or annual subscription options. Reports suggest prices started around $200 per month or $1,700 per year, and the tool quickly gained traction among low-skill actors.

WormGPT took a similar path. Built on GPT-J, an open-source large language model, it was pitched as a blackhat version of ChatGPT. Access was sold for about $110 per month. Its purpose was direct and simple: create convincing phishing emails at scale. No broken grammar, no obvious red flags, just messages that looked like they came from HR, finance, or a trusted business partner.

The sophistication of phishing is no longer limited to email. Voice cloning and deepfakes have introduced new angles. A call that sounds exactly like your CEO asking for an urgent wire transfer is no longer a far-fetched scenario. In fact, there have already been documented cases where voice cloning was used to defraud companies out of millions. With AI, creating those convincing imitations is faster, cheaper, and accessible to far more actors.

Phishing is no longer amateur hour. It is a professionalized service where attackers can outsource creativity to AI.

Ransomware Learns New Tricks

Ransomware groups are also adapting AI to their playbooks. Their goal is still the same: encrypt critical systems, steal sensitive data, and demand payment. But AI is streamlining the process.

Some ransomware crews are using AI to refine malicious code and bypass defenses more effectively. Others are experimenting with automated infection chains where AI scripts help identify weak points in networks and tailor payloads to exploit them. In some cases, AI has even been proposed for ransom negotiations, where chatbots could pressure victims with manipulative tactics and personalized responses.

This isn’t happening in a vacuum. Ransomware gangs are structured like businesses. They often run affiliate programs, recruit developers, and maintain support channels for buyers. AI fits neatly into that structure. It reduces the technical barrier, speeds up development, and frees attackers to scale operations.

The real danger is not just that AI makes ransomware more efficient. It also makes entry into ransomware easier. Someone with little coding experience can join an affiliate program, buy access to AI tools, and launch a campaign without building malware from scratch. The result is more actors competing for victims, which increases the volume of attacks globally.

Stealer Logs Become Supercharged

If phishing is the entry point and ransomware is the hammer, stealer logs are the raw material that fuels countless other crimes. A stealer log is a collection of data siphoned from an infected machine: usernames, passwords, browser cookies, autofill data, cryptocurrency wallets, system details. For years, these logs have been sold in bulk on darknet markets.

AI has made them far easier to exploit. Instead of combing through messy text files manually, criminals now use AI-driven tools to parse, filter, and prioritize data. They can search for keywords like “PayPal” or “VPN” and instantly extract the most valuable credentials. Dashboards sold with these logs make it simple for even unskilled actors to profit.

Consider Rhadamanthys, a stealer that first appeared in late 2022. By mid 2024, version 0.7.0 introduced an unusual AI-powered capability: optical character recognition. It could scan images on infected devices and extract text, including cryptocurrency wallet seed phrases. This meant that even if users thought they were safe storing keys as screenshots, the malware could still retrieve them.

Rhadamanthys is sold openly on forums. Licenses go for about $250 per month or $550 for 90 days. Its operators actively update the malware, provide customer support via Telegram, and advertise new features. In 2024, it was deployed through phishing campaigns disguised as copyright infringement notices, targeting victims across Europe, Asia, and the Americas.

Beyond individual families, the stealer ecosystem is vast. Russian Market alone lists millions of stolen logs, and services like MoonCloud repackage them into searchable databases distributed via Telegram. These markets are increasingly structured and automated, looking more like data brokers than ad-hoc criminal sales.

The Darknet as a Service

One of the most striking trends is how the darknet has adopted the language and business model of the tech industry. Gone are the days of one-off toolkits passed quietly between hackers. Today, the underground thrives on subscriptions and services.

Fraud as a service. Phishing as a service. Ransomware as a service. Infostealers with monthly licensing models. AI has lowered the barrier to entry so far that the ecosystem resembles a SaaS marketplace more than a shadowy corner of the web. For a few hundred dollars a month, anyone can buy access to tools that rival those used by advanced threat groups.

This professionalization is why the threat landscape feels so much more crowded. More people can play the game. The cost of entry is low. And the tools are good enough to work.

Why Visibility Matters and How DarkOwl Helps

If criminals are scaling with AI, defenders cannot rely on traditional defenses alone. Organizations need visibility into the spaces where these tools are sold and discussed. That is where DarkOwl provides value.

DarkOwl monitors darknet forums, encrypted channels, and marketplaces where AI-enabled tools and stolen data appear. It can identify when a new phishing kit is advertised, when stealer logs containing company credentials are posted, or when chatter about impersonation campaigns surfaces. More importantly, DarkOwl delivers context. A stolen password alone is one data point. Context explains whether it is tied to a broader campaign, how it was obtained, and whether similar data is being circulated elsewhere.

This intelligence is not meant to sit in a report. Organizations can act on it by building alerting workflows, so security teams are notified when company credentials show up in stealer logs, updating phishing playbooks with new lures seen in underground communities, and protecting executives and brands by monitoring for deepfake or impersonation campaigns.

DarkOwl does not just collect data; it helps organizations use it. That difference is what turns visibility into defense.

Final Thought

AI has not changed the fundamentals of cybercrime. Criminals are still phishing, encrypting, and stealing. What has changed is the scale and accessibility. FraudGPT makes phishing believable. WormGPT mass-produces scams. Rhadamanthys uses AI to scrape sensitive data from images. Marketplaces sell logs with dashboards and filters that look like professional analytics tools. The Darknet is evolving, and AI is accelerating the pace.

The world cannot afford to ignore that shift. Defenders need to see what is happening in the underground as it unfolds. DarkOwl delivers that window, giving organizations the ability to anticipate threats, connect the dots, and respond before AI-driven attacks land.

Have questions? Contact us.

Antivirus vs Antimalware: What’s the Real Difference and Do You Need Both?

Written by DarkOwl Content Team on September 16, 2025. Posted in Blog.

September 16, 2025

We all know cybersecurity has its own language. As being cyber safe becomes more and more vital to both companies and individuals alike, it’s important to have a basic understanding on common terms. In this blog, let’s explore the subtle differences between antivirus and antimalware and if you need both.

Antivirus Vs Antimalware

The terms “antivirus” and “antimalware” are often used interchangeably. It is important to understand that while they are related, there is a historical difference and a functional distinction.

Antivirus

Antivirus is a type of software designed to detect, prevent, and remove malicious programs from a computer or network. While the name historically refers to software that protects against computer viruses specifically, the term has evolved to encompass protection against a wide range of cyber threats. It acts as a crucial defense against various digital threats that can harm your system, steal data, or compromise your privacy.

Traditionally, antivirus software excelled at:

Signature-Based Detection: This method relies on a vast database of “signatures” – unique digital fingerprints of known viruses. When a file is scanned, its code is compared to these signatures. If a match is found, the virus is identified and dealt with.
Preventing Replication: Its primary objective was to stop viruses from attaching themselves to legitimate programs and spreading across your system or network.
Cleaning and Quarantining: Upon detection, it would either “clean” (remove the malicious code from an infected file) or “quarantine” (isolate the infected file to prevent it from causing further harm) the threat.

One can think of antivirus as a specialist. It was exceptionally good at identifying and neutralizing the self-replicating, often disruptive, digital invaders that defined the early days of cybercrime.

As the threat landscape evolved, so did the sophistication of malicious software. Viruses were still a threat but now, we were up against worms, Trojans, spyware, adware, ransomware, rootkits, and more. This is where the lines begin to blur and the term “malware” enters. It is important to note that while all viruses are malware, not all malware are viruses. This difference between malware and virus is the crux of the difference between “antivirus” and the more encompassing “antimalware.”

Antimalware

Antimalware is a type of software designed to detect, prevent, and remove all forms of malicious software (malware) from computers and other digital devices. Unlike traditional “antivirus” that historically focused primarily on computer viruses, antimalware offers a broader, more comprehensive defense against the entire spectrum of digital threats.

Threats that antimalware defends against include:

Viruses: The original self-replicating programs that attach to legitimate software.
Worms: Standalone malicious programs that spread across networks without needing a host program.
Trojans (Trojan Horses): Programs that appear legitimate but hide malicious functions, often creating backdoors for attackers.
Ransomware: Malware that encrypts a victim’s files, demanding payment (ransom) for their decryption.
Spyware: Software that secretly monitors and collects information about a user’s activities without their knowledge or consent.
Adware: Software that automatically displays unwanted advertisements, often bundled with free programs.
Rootkits: Malicious software designed to hide the existence of other malware and enable persistent privileged access to a computer.
Keyloggers: Programs that record every keystroke made by a user, potentially capturing sensitive information like passwords.
Bots/Botnets: Software that allows an attacker to remotely control a compromised computer, often as part of a larger network of infected machines (a botnet).

Antivirus traditionally focuses on file-infecting threats; Antimalware is more adept at combating newer, evolving threats that may not be file-based.

A Side by Side Comparison

Antivirus

specific type of protection
combats filed-infecting threats
basic scanning, detection, removal, and quarantine of viruses
relies on signature-based detection (databases of known virus “fingerprints”)
the original digital defense; the term is somewhat historical but often used generically (commonly used by the general public, but often refers to a broader “antimalware” solution)

Antimalware

broad and comprehensive protection
combats new, evolving threats that may not be file-based
real-time protection, advanced threat blocking, web/email protection, exploit prevention, sandboxing
incorporates more advanced, proactive methods like heuristic analysis and behavioral monitoring to catch unknown threats
the evolution of antivirus; the more accurate term for today’s holistic digital protection

A Real Life Example: Mustang Panda

Earlier this year, researchers at TrendMicro have observed the Chinese state-sponsored threat actor Mustang Panda (also known as Earth Preta) using a new technique to “evade detection and maintain control over infected systems.” Specifically, the hacking group uses the legitimate Microsoft Application Virtualization Injector (MAVInject.exe) to “inject payloads into waitfor.exe whenever an ESET antivirus application is detected.” As highlighted in TrendMicro’s report, Mustang Panda is known for targeting victims in the Asia-Pacific region, with one of its recent campaigns utilizing a variant of DOPLUGS malware to target multiple countries in the region, including Taiwan, Vietnam, and Malaysia. The threat actor notably targets government entities, and “has had over 200 victims since 2022.”

Do You Need Both?

DarkOwl does not recommend having both an antimalware software and an antivirus software. This can cause conflicts and redundancies, as well as slow down your computer. It is recommended to have one comprehensive security solution active at a time. This single program will provide all the necessary layers of protection without causing conflicts. This is why many companies have moved from branding their products as “Antivirus” to names like “Internet Security,” “Total Protection,” or simply “Endpoint Protection” to reflect the broad range of threats they address.

As always, practice good cyber hygiene – check to make sure that your current software is up-to-date and offers multi-layered protection.

Conclusion

Ultimately, the distinction between “antivirus” and “antimalware” is not just semantic; it reflects the evolution of the cybersecurity landscape. While antivirus was our original digital defense, designed to combat the classic computer virus, today’s multifaceted threat environment demands a more comprehensive solution. A modern antimalware program is that solution, offering multi-layered protection against everything from file-infecting viruses to sophisticated ransomware and fileless malware.

As we’ve established, you do not need both—and for the sake of your system’s performance and security, you shouldn’t run both. The best practice is to choose one powerful, reputable security suite that is regularly updated. This single tool, combined with your own vigilance and good cyber hygiene, is your strongest defense against the full spectrum of digital threats today and in the future.

Is Your City on the Dark Web? What Local Agencies Need to Know

Written by DarkOwl Content Team on September 9, 2025. Posted in Blog.

September 09, 2025

In 2023, investigators in a midsize U.S. city were tipped off to a darknet marketplace vendor offering “same-day delivery” of fentanyl-laced pills within specific zip codes. The listing named street corners and used coded references to local schools. It was not discovered by routine patrols or a community tip. It was found in an online space most local agencies never check: the dark web.

The dark web is not just a place for global cybercriminal networks. It is a sprawling ecosystem where local-level threats are planned, traded, and discussed. Understanding what is being said about your city, and acting on it, can mean stopping crime before it happens.

Why the Dark Web Matters for Local Agencies

A Hidden Hub for Localized Criminal Activity

Criminal forums, encrypted chat channels, and darknet leak sites often contain references to specific cities, schools, or government offices. These may range from targeted doxxing threats against police officers to lists of stolen IDs from local residents. Without visibility into these spaces, agencies risk missing critical intelligence (NIJ).

Growing Scale of Criminal Commerce

Dark web markets remain a preferred channel for selling drugs, stolen goods, counterfeit currency, and hacking tools. Europol has documented that some sellers specialize in hyper local delivery, building trust with buyers in their own city. One marketplace studied by the NIJ generated $219 million annually, a portion of which was linked to transactions tied to specific U.S. cities.

Evidence of Real-World Impact

The FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) reported 880,418 cybercrime complaints in 2023, a 10 percent increase over 2022, with losses exceeding $12.5 billion (FBI IC3). While many of these cases start online, a significant number have local victims and suspects, with planning or stolen data originating from the darknet.

Common Local Mentions on the Dark Web

City and County Names – Drug vendors advertising “free delivery within [city limits]” or fencing stolen goods.
Schools and Universities – Targets of swatting threats, harassment campaigns, or worse.
Police Departments – Mentioned in extremist forums or ransomware leak sites after data breaches.
Hospitals and Public Services – Victims of cyberattacks where stolen patient data is posted for sale.
Street-Level Detail – Criminals using neighborhood or landmark names to coordinate illicit meetups.

These are not hypothetical. They appear regularly in open-source criminal case records and public takedown reports.

From Discovery to Action: How Agencies Can Use Dark Web Intelligence

When local law enforcement gains visibility into the darknet, it often changes how investigations unfold. For example:

Drug Enforcement – Narcotics units can identify vendors selling in their jurisdiction, connect them to street-level operations, and coordinate controlled buys.
Cybercrime and Fraud – Financial crimes units can trace stolen credit cards, bank logins, or PII from local residents back to breaches.
Threat Assessment – School resource officers or fusion centers can evaluate online threats referencing specific campuses.

This process often begins with keyword and geographic monitoring, searching for place names, zip codes, or organizational identifiers in darknet marketplaces, forums, and leak sites. Tools like DarkOwl can streamline this by indexing these spaces and allowing agencies to search them without direct engagement. All DarkOwl data is collected in compliance with U.S. Department of Justice guidelines, ensuring passive, lawful acquisition from darknet and darknet-adjacent sources.

Case Studies: Real-World Ransomware Attacks on Police Departments

In 2021, the Babuk ransomware group breached the Metropolitan Police Department in Washington, D.C., and leaked thousands of sensitive internal files on a dark web site. These included disciplinary records, intelligence reports, and details about confidential informants. The incident was described by cybersecurity experts as one of the most serious ransomware attacks ever against a U.S. law enforcement agency. Investigators had to rapidly assess the scope of the breach, contain the fallout, and communicate with the public while attackers continued to post stolen material.

In a separate case, 200 gigabytes of data from the Presque Isle Police Department in Maine was leaked online by Distributed Denial of Secrets (DDoSecrets). The dataset contained decades of emails, internal reports, and sensitive law enforcement files. While the organization chose not to make the entire dataset publicly available, the breach was confirmed and highlighted the vulnerability of smaller police departments to cyberattacks.

These incidents are a reminder that police departments of all sizes are potential ransomware targets and that early detection of leaked data on the dark web can help agencies respond more effectively.

Challenges and Best Practices

Legal Compliance – Work only with vetted intelligence sources that follow DOJ guidance.
Evidence Handling – Ensure dark web data is preserved in ways that maintain chain of custody.
Training – Provide investigators with skills to interpret darknet information and link it to real-world cases.
Partnerships – Collaborate with state, federal, and fusion center partners to share findings.

Conclusion

Your city is likely being mentioned on the dark web, whether in a passing conversation or as part of a targeted plot. For local law enforcement, this is no longer an obscure cyber issue. It is a street-level problem with online roots.

By incorporating dark web monitoring into investigative workflows, agencies can spot emerging threats, connect them to local activity, and act before harm occurs. In a world where crime moves between the physical and digital in seconds, ignoring the darknet is no longer an option.

Learn how DarkOwl informs law enforcement investigations.

Threat Intelligence RoundUp: August

Written by DarkOwl Content Team on September 2, 2025. Posted in Blog.

September 02, 2025

1. ‘Chairmen’ of $100 million scam operation extradited to US – Bleeping Computer

In an August 8 press release, the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York announced the extradition of four Ghanaian nationals for participating in an international criminal organization “that stole more than $100 million from victims via romance scams and business email compromises.” The four individuals were reportedly high-ranking members of a Ghanaian criminal organization that targeted entities in the U.S. between 2016 and 2023. The defendants were extradited from Ghana and arrived in the U.S. on August 7. Read full article.

2. New EDR killer tool used by eight different ransomware groups – Bleeping Computer

According to BleepingComputer, eight different ransomware groups have been observed using a new endpoint detection and response (EDR) killer believed to be an evolution of the “EDRKillShifter” developed by RansomHub. EDR killers are a useful tool for threat actors as they turn off security products on targeted systems to help remain undetected. As of this writing, the eight groups seen using the new tool include RansomHub, Blacksuit, Medusa, Qilin, Dragonforce, Crytox, Lynx, and INC. Article here.

3. CTM360 spots Malicious ‘FraudOnTok’ Campaign Targeting TikTok Shop users – Bleeping Computer

Researchers at CTM360 have identified a new malware campaign dubbed “FraudOnTok” that targets users through fake TikTok Shops with SparkKitty spyware. According to the cybersecurity company’s report, the campaign is characterized by a dual attack strategy combining both phishing and malware to target TikTok users. The threat actors utilize replicas of TikTok Shop, TikTok Wholesale, and TikTok Mall to deceive users into believing they’re using the genuine platforms before stealing cryptocurrency wallets. Read more here.

4. Cyber Espionage Campaign Hits Russian Aerospace Sector Using EAGLET Backdoor – The Hacker News

Researchers at SEQRITE Labs have observed a cyberespionage campaign targeting Russian aerospace and defense industries. According to the company’s report, the campaign has specifically targeted employees at Voronezh Aircraft Production Association (VASO), one of Russia’s largest aircraft production entities. The activity has been dubbed “Operation CargoTalon” and functions by delivering a backdoor called EAGLET to exfiltrate data. The threat actor is currently being tracked as UNG0901. Read here.

5. Cybercrime Groups ShinyHunters, Scattered Spider Join Forces in Extortion Attacks on Businesses – Bleeping Computer

Researchers at ReliaQuest have observed a shift in tactics used by the hacking group ShinyHunters that suggests possible collaboration with the Scattered Spider group. Following a year of limited activity, ShinyHunters’ campaigns resurged this summer with a series of attacks against Salesforce customers. These recent operations have used techniques previously observed in attacks attributed to Scattered Spider. Specifically, these have included impersonating IT support staff, using apps that masquerade as legitimate tools, VPN obfuscation, and “Okta-themed phishing pages to trick victims into entering credentials during vishing call.” Learn more.

6. Hacker extradited to US for stealing $3.3 million from taxpayers – Bleeping Computer

In an August 5 press release, the U.S. Department of Justice announced the extradition of a Nigerian national to the U.S. from France “in connection with hacking, fraud, and identity theft offenses.” According to the statement, the subject participated in multiple fraud schemes, including one targeting U.S. tax businesses to defraud the IRS since at least 2019. The scheme involved other Nigeria-based co-conspirators who used spear phishing emails to hack “several U.S. based businesses located in New York, Texas, and other states.” Read full article.

7. CERT-UA Warns of HTA-Delivered C# Malware Attacks Using Court Summons Lures – The Hacker News

In an August 4 press release, Ukraine’s Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-UA) warned of a series of cyber attacks carried out by the threat actor UAC-0099 against “state authorities, the Defense Forces, and enterprises of the defense-industrial complex of Ukraine.” As noted in the statement, the threat actor delivers MATCHBOIL, MATCHWOK, and DRAGSTARE malware via phishing emails. The emails are predominantly sent from UKR.NET addresses and are presented as official “court summons.” Read full article.

8. US sanctions North Korean firm, nationals behind IT worker schemes – Bleeping Computer

In a July 24 press release, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced the sanctioning of the North Korea-based Korea Sobaeksu Trading Company and three associated individuals for their participation in fraudulent remote IT worker schemes. As previously noted in DarkOwl’s Weekly Intelligence Summaries, the DPRK government uses these IT worker schemes to generate illicit revenue. The IT workers involved in the scheme use “fraudulent documents, stolen identities, and false personas to obfuscate their identities and infiltrate legitimate companies.” Learn more.

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What is Credential Stuffing?

Written by DarkOwl Content Team on August 28, 2025. Posted in Blog.

August 28, 2025

In this blog series, we aim to explain and simplify some of the most commonly used terms. Previously, we have covered bullet proof hosting, CVEs, APIs, brute force attacks, zero-day exploits, doxing, data harvesting, and IoCs. In this edition, we dive into credential stuffing.

Credential Stuffing 101

Credential stuffing, often shortened to ‘cred stuffing’, is a widespread technique utilized by cybercriminals to test if historically exposed e-mail addresses and password combinations are valid logins across multiple commercial websites. Opportunistic cyber criminals automate the testing of large ‘combo lists’ containing compromised e-mail addresses and passwords against commercial websites and once a successful authentication occurs readily steals the PII (personally identifiable information) and financial information, often saved, on the e-commerce shopping platform’s user profile.

Wordlists and compromised lists of email address and password combinations are the foundation for credential stuffing operations. Many multi-million record data leaks in circulation on the darknet make potential username/password combinations easily discoverable and exploitable at scale. Such leaks are utilized as input for credential stuffing scripts and applications. Wordlists are also in regular circulation amongst darknet threat actors, and some are already integrated into Linux distributions favored by pen-testers and hackers alike.

Figure 1: Wordlist Github Repository Popular with Offensive Security Specialists

Credential stuffing using malicious software and botnets affects not only the individuals but also the commercial organizations whose user accounts are surreptitiously accessed, as many immediately assume access was achieved due to vulnerabilities with the commercial service provider’s technical configuration instead of a simple credential stuffing technique conducted en masse. The uncertainty potentially erodes consumer and stakeholder confidence warranting that commercial agencies consider credential stuffing in their internal security frameworks and corporate risk assessments as well.

To the left we see an example of a combolist (a list of email addresses and password combinations that may be used in a brute force attempt or credential stuffing operations to gain unauthorized access to servers and services) that was leaked and posted on a darknet site. Databases from data harvesting will often include usernames and passwords, fullz (full identity profiles), financial records or health records. These are all often highly confidential or sensitive and can cause a lot of harm and headache when posted without consent.

Credential stuffing campaigns exploit password reuse and utilize email address and password combinations to attempt logins outside of the source of the original leak. Although you can’t prevent commercial services getting breached and usernames, email addresses, and password combinations getting leaked, you can follow some simple steps to ensure you employ robust password hygiene and reduce the risk of a password getting brute forced or exploited in a credential stuffing campaign. We review this steps later on in this blog.

Credential Stuffing in the Wild

The North Face

In a customer notice letter in June, The North Face revealed that on April 23, 2025, it was discovered that customer information was stolen in a credential stuffing attack. Exposed information includes full names, purchase histories, shipping addresses, email addresses, dates of birth, and phone numbers.

Hacking Forums Seized in “Operation Talent”

In January, the hacking forums Cracked[.]io and Nulled[.]to were seized following an international law enforcement operation dubbed “Operation Talent.” The joint operation involved law enforcement departments from the United States, Italy, Spain, Europe, France, Greece, Australia, and Romania. Additional impacted sites included starkrdp[.]io, mysellix[.]io, and sellix[.]io. As highlighted by CyberScoop, SellIX allowed users to create storefronts for illicit goods while StarkRDP—the remote desktop hosting service—“was allegedly leveraged by threat actors to anonymize attacks.”

The seizure of multiple major online forums linked to cybercrime reflects ongoing international law enforcement efforts to crack down on cybercrime by dismantling infrastructure used for illicit activity. Cracked[.]io and Nulled[.]to in particular were known for hosting cybercriminal activity, including “password theft, cracking, and credential stuffing attacks.” Similar large scale law enforcement operations have been observed in recent years, including the takedown of BreachForums in May, 2024.

New Atlantis AIO platform automates credential stuffing on 140 services

In March Bleeping Computer reported a new cybercrime platform called “Atlantis AIO” which automates credential stuffing attacks on over 140 online services. Atlantis AIO features modules for brute-force attacks, CAPTCHA bypass, and automated account recovery. It targets various services including email, e-commerce, banking, and VPNs. Compromised accounts are often sold on underground forums. To defend against such attacks, the article recommends using strong, unique passwords and multi-factor authentication, and for websites to implement rate limiting, advanced CAPTCHAs, and suspicious behavior monitoring.

Actor Spotlight: ShinyHunters

ShinyHunters is a cybercriminal group known for their high-profile data breaches and relentless pursuit of sensitive information, and has carved out a reputation as one of the most prolific and dangerous actors in the cybercrime arena. They are known to infiltrate company databases, exfiltrating sensitive information, and then selling this data on underground forums or using it for extortion purposes. They are not shy about sharing this information on dark web sites created to share exfiltrated data. ShinyHunters utilize advanced hacking techniques to gain unauthorized access to company systems. They often exploit vulnerabilities in web applications, engage in credential stuffing attacks, and use phishing campaigns to steal login credentials.

How to Avoid Being Exploited in a Credential Stuffing Campaign

Everyone can follow some simple steps to ensure you employ robust password hygiene and reduce the risk of a password getting brute forced or exploited in a credential stuffing campaign.

Turn on multi-factor authentication (MFA) for important accounts like financial and banking sites.
Use an automated complex password Manager like Lastpass, BitWarden, or 1Password.
Don’t reuse passwords. Have unique password for every login and streaming service you sign up for.
Choose passwords at least 16 characters in length.
Include symbols and numbers for increased complexity.
Avoid using passwords with dictionary words or names.
Don’t use sequential numbers or the word “password”
Don’t use the year of your birth or anniversary in your password.

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Highlighting Women in Cyber for Women’s Equality Day

Written by DarkOwl Content Team on August 26, 2025. Posted in Blog.

Interview with DarkOwl’s Alison Halland and Jennifer Ewbank

August 26, 2025

For the fourth year in a row, in honor of Women’s Equality Day today, August 26^th, the DarkOwl marketing team highlights the women in our workforce. This year, our DarkOwl Chief Business Officer, Alison Halland, interviews a member of our Board of Directors, Jennifer Ewbank. DarkOwl is very proud of our women leadership and workforce and strives to continue to build a balanced workforce with the most talented and effective team possible.

Interview: Thoughts on Being a Women in Cybersecurity from Two Members of DarkOwl’s Team

To commemorate Women’s Equality Day, we sat down for a candid interview about working in the cybersecurity industry with two women from our team.

Editors Note: Some content has been edited for length and clarity.

Intro

In a world increasingly reliant on digital infrastructure, the need for robust cybersecurity has never been more critical. Yet, as the threats evolve, so too must our approach to building the defenses. One of the most promising avenues for strengthening our digital shield lies in fostering a more diverse and inclusive cybersecurity workforce, particularly by empowering women in this vital field.

While challenges remain, the landscape is shifting. Just a few years ago in 2019, women constituted only about 20% of the global cybersecurity workforce. Today, that number has modestly, yet significantly, climbed to around 25%, with projections aiming for 30% by 2025 and potentially 35% by 2031. This upward trend is a testament to the incredible talent and dedication of women who are stepping up to fill a critical void, especially given that an estimated 3.5 million cybersecurity roles remain unfilled globally between 2022 and 2025.

Over half of all cybersecurity professionals, regardless of gender, entered the field from non-IT backgrounds. This includes 17% who transitioned from entirely unrelated careers, 15% who leveraged formal education, and another 15% who are self-taught or independently explored the space. This highlights that a passion for problem-solving and a dedication to digital safety are far more crucial than a traditional tech background.

Beyond professional strides, the statistics also underscore the importance of fostering safer online spaces. While not directly about careers, it’s telling that only 23-24% of women feel comfortable expressing political opinions online, compared to around 40% of men. The significantly higher fear of online harm, from misogyny to cyberstalking, and its heavier psychological impact, leads women to use more “safety tools” and engage less in online participation. By championing women in cybersecurity, we’re not just building a stronger defense for everyone, but also fostering a more equitable and secure digital world where all voices can thrive without fear.

Join us as we celebrate the trailblazing women who are shaping the future of cybersecurity, inspiring the next generation, and proving that diversity is our greatest strength in the digital age.

Alison: Thank you so much, Jennifer, for taking this time. I always enjoy speaking with you. And for those of you that don’t know, Jennifer Ewbank served as the Deputy Director of the CIA for Digital Innovation. And you were there from 2019, having recently retired in January of 2024. Did I get those dates right?

Jennifer: I was in that role from 2019 to January 2024, and then I retired from CIA a couple months after that. Yes.

Alison: And then Jennifer joined the DarkOwl board in 2024, and she’s been instrumental in helping us navigate the government landscape and providing us with so much feedback. So thank you for that, Jennifer. Thank you.

I wanted to do something a little bit different and dig into some of your background. Women’s Equality Day is coming up August 26th, and this is celebrated every year to commemorate the anniversary of the 19th Amendment to the Constitution, which granted all of us women the right to vote. I wanted to ask some questions geared both at your background, how you got into the CIA, and focus a little bit on women in that field.

As we know, there’s a huge gap globally right now in that field. There’s an estimated 3.5 million cybersecurity roles that were unfilled in the last three years. So there’s a talent gap. And, according to some of the statistics I was looking at, women only represent about a quarter of the global cybersecurity workforce, which is up from 20% in 2019. But I think that’s a pretty modest increase.

To kick things off, I am curious what it was like coming up through the CIA – specifically as a woman and if you ever faced any kind of imposter syndrome, or just speak a little about what it was like to be a female within the CIA organization.

Jennifer: Thank you. So a bit of this is going to be like archaeology for young people, right? Because, you know, I joined the CIA long, long, long ago. I didn’t join in a technical field, I joined in the operational world. Hollywood would have you think that that’s James Bond, which is obviously glamorized and dramatized. But, there’s some truth to the fundamental tasks that one has to perform in operations. So that is collecting secrets about what your adversaries around the world want to do to harm the United States and our allies. So that’s terrorist plots, it’s plans to proliferate weapons of mass destruction, it’s plans to penetrate our government with espionage, lots and lots of plans for a coup, plans for international narcotics trafficking. And the job was to go out and find those things and thwart the threats.

Alison: How old were you when you stepped into the operation?

Jennifer: I was young. So, I was in the State Department first, joined in my late 20s, and then a few years later, now people are going to do their math because you have a lot of smart people at DarkOwl. A few years later, the Cold War ended and our mission really changed at the State Department. I had joined thinking I was going to fight international communism through diplomacy, which was, you know, kind of corny, I think people would think today, but that’s how I grew up – a child of the 60s and the space race. And those things really mattered to me. And so the mission changed. I had a great experience, but I thought, hey, I want to do something else. And I wanted to do something a bit, I don’t know, let’s say bold. So I went off and did something that most rational people don’t do, which is join the CIA and become an operations officer. So I was still young at that point.

I spent decades moving around the world to different countries every couple of years, learning a different language, meeting new people, tackling new issues, and then climbing the ladder at the CIA in the operational world to become a chief of station, which is their senior most role in each country, that is responsible for everything CIA does, but also is kind of a coordinator, integrator of everything the broader intelligence community does.

I served in that role four times. As I tell people, it was small, medium, large mega stations all the way through the stack. And then after that last experience, I was invited to take this Digital Tech Deputy Director role by our Director.

Alison: Had any females served in those roles?

Jennifer: It’s a good question because when I joined, there were very, very few women in operations. It had a certain stereotype of who a “successful” officer was, and that stereotype was a very outgoing, extroverted, sociable guy. And there was a reason for that stereotype because that’s what the world was and those were the people who were successful. And somehow I thought, well, I can do that. And all those things I just described, I am not a single one of those things: not a guy, not an extrovert. I’ll phrase it this way, it’s an extreme career. If I wanted to be an astronaut, which I wanted to be when I was a child, or a fighter pilot, or a firefighter, it’s an extreme career, it’s all consuming, and it demands a lot of people. It demands everything of you. It’s full commitment. I thought, you know, I’m going to try that.

The challenge, back to our theme, was that there really were very few women. I didn’t work for a woman directly for, oh, I don’t know, 15 years. And I didn’t really have in my orbit people who would be role models or sponsors or mentors who happened to be women. The good news, in a way, and of course, like any large organization, the CIA has had its issues over the years, but, in some ways, the CIA is the ultimate meritocracy. It is all about outcomes. And so you deliver, and now that’s not to say that there aren’t individual cases where people experience discrimination of one kind or another, because of course, they’re human just like any other place. And so, good is balanced with people who aren’t so great. But more or less, it is a meritocracy and that’s how you kind of succeed. And so luckily for me, I worked for bosses who were keen to just get great results.

If I can just make a little bit of a detour, I’ll share with you. So my first tour, as we call our assignments overseas, my first tour as a case officer with operations, I would say the first year, I really did flail about a little bit trying to figure out how I’m going to do this. Because, again, there was a certain stereotype for how the job was done. And I’ll oversimplify, but it’s, you know, roll into a diplomatic reception, lots of glad handing and, you know, whiskey in one hand and a cigar in the other hand. And, inviting everybody, invite guys out to play golf and late-night drinking. Socially, it was a certain stereotype. And I wasn’t any of those things. And in the country where I was serving, it was not usual for young women to come rolling into a reception alone and chat up men. And so it wasn’t structured for my success and I wasn’t really designed for that. And so I had, at the end of about my first year, I won’t call it a crisis, but a real moment where I had to dig deep and I thought if I’m going to succeed I have to figure out a different way to do this and I’m not ever going to succeed if I play this game by the rules that exist today. I had to – this is going to sound a little strange perhaps – sit back and really analyze who these people were who were succeeding in a traditional model: those who were out in our environment had access to secrets that we really needed to collect for the agency and for our country. And then what were my comparative advantages in this environment? What were the things that I could do that other people couldn’t do? And there were some things. And I had, I’ll say modestly, I had exceptional foreign language skills in this very difficult language. None of the men in my office did. So that gave me a leg up. I had, therefore, a deeper connection to culture and history of that country than others did. I was very good at what we called handling things – our assets, our sources, really maximizing the collection of intelligence, handling the cases well with good tradecraft, securely. There were things that I did well and that I could handle a large volume of work. And so I could just continue – continue to pump out more and more and more and more. And so, I found a way to take those things that I did well and turn them into my special way of doing the job and delivered results. As I was saying, it’s a meritocracy. And so, at the end of that second year, I sat down with my supervisor and we had an annual performance review. He was a great guy, very candid. He said, look, I’m struggling with how I evaluate you. And I said, okay, talk to me about that. And he said, you’re producing a lot, but I don’t see the classic approach and skills being honed. I said, okay, that’s fair enough. But is the challenge to produce or is the challenge to be like everybody else? And to his credit, he said, you’re right. And we had a narrative section, then we had numbers, we scored on various skills. And so he struggled with the scores. He’s like, you know what, you’re right. And he gave me the top numerical score for all those categories because of the delivery. So that’s a really long way of saying that meritocracy did matter. But that’s not to say it was easy, not at all.

Alison: Was there scrutiny over your different approach? Sounds like there was.

Jennifer: There’s a lot. That’s an interesting question, actually, because in the CIA, particularly in the operational world, there’s a lot of autonomy. You are trained, you are vetted, you are trusted to do things appropriately without supervision because the job is alone. You’re out doing your job alone. And so you go out and do your thing, come back and report. You’re expected to report fully and with integrity in detail on everything you’ve done. And so I did not encounter resistance along the way. So it’s really a long way of saying that it’s a really hard job. It’s a really hard job and it takes everything out of you.

I wrote a book review recently. Somebody had written a book about being a woman in the CIA, and I said something about it being a career guided by the goddess Kali, you know, both destruction and creation simultaneously – a job you love, even as it’s basically ripping you apart. And it’s just, all-consuming, and it was. So I will say that’s a long description of the job, but I came up through that world in a career that tracked the development of digital tech and its application to this very specialized, challenging mission.

And so when I, in 2019, was returning from one of these big posts, our largest place overseas, our director invited me to become one of her deputy directors for digital innovation, as you mentioned, which is all the digital tech stuff. So IT, global secure communications, cybersecurity, cyber collection, open source intelligence, data science, artificial intelligence, a bunch of policy and legal stuff and then training and education, et cetera. Lots of other things hanging off of that directorate, but a big job. And her intent in doing that was to bring somebody with a field perspective, a practitioner, to come partner with amazing technologists to serve as a bit of a catalyst. And that was a great experience for me. I hope people who worked with me would say the same. I think it was overall quite successful. But that was my, let’s say, non-traditional path into digital tech.

I wasn’t completely ignorant of it all. I had some background and I’d certainly been on the user end of every new technology that we had created. And by nature of the teams that I led overseas, we were actually right in the mix innovating with technologists to solve tough problems in tough places. And so it gave me, I would say, a complimentary perspective on what we needed to do in digital tech to succeed.

Alison: Do you feel like you garnered more respect in that role because you had already been in an operational role and actually been boots on the ground, as they like to say?

Jennifer: Well, you know fair question – so the CIA is a large organization and like any large organization you have your different tribes and cultures and so coming into digital tech, I would suggest there were probably a few senior officers there, officials who thought that they should be in my job. Right? Why do we need this outsider? And so there was a bit of skepticism. It did help in two different ways, initially it helped in terms of credibility with folks in the operational world and the analytic world – kind of more directly mission facing roles – recruiting spies, producing analysis for the president, doing the things that the CIA was created to do. And so with them, I think it gave me direct credibility. And there was a lot of engagement around what they needed? What were we doing well? What could we do better in the future, etc. So I think that was helpful for what was a relatively new organization at the time, this directorate.

And then over time, and it didn’t take that long, I figured out what my complementary skill set would be to lead that organization and part of it was really all around that connection to mission – the connection to the big “why,” a sense of purpose around what we are here to do and then rallying that organization around a common understanding of what our key challenges were, which were in the form of a particular very aggressive and capable adversary. I think that helped a lot because I didn’t try to pretend that I was going to be the best data scientist or that I was an expert at cybersecurity more so than the CISO, none of that. I always approached those discussions with humility in terms of the technical expertise, but confidence in terms of what I understood we needed to accomplish and I think that balance worked.

Alison: Did that skepticism motivate you or intimidate you?

Jennifer: You know, it did not surprise me. It did not intimidate me. I mean, I’m kind of driven anyways. So I guess motivation? Sure, sure. It pushed me to dig deep and figure out what I was going to do? Again, back to that story from my first assignment last year. What were my strategic or comparative advantages? How was I going to play to my strengths and not focus on trying to polish up any perceived weakness, right? I think a lot of people waste time on weaknesses. Of course, you know, you want continuing education, you want to keep learning, you want to keep developing, all of that’s great. But if I spend all my time thinking about my relative deficiencies in, you know, coding Python, that’s a waste of my time and energy. And that’s not how you win. You win by playing to, I believe, your comparative strengths. And so I cataloged those. I looked across this organization with thousands and thousands and thousands of people and billions of dollars in budget all around the world. And yes, I can say there were a handful of things that I brought that nobody else did. And that’s what I tried to focus on.

Alison: Did you go through the activity of actually writing those down, pen to paper?

Jennifer: I would say it was a mental list in that instance. But over time, sure, I did kind of articulate those things. But I think that does go back to that first, that very first, very difficult assignment with the CIA, doing an impossible job. I mean, most people would consider it an impossible job. And trying to figure out how on earth I was going to succeed if what I had learned in training and the model that I saw all around me was not the model that would work for me. So very much the same approach.

Alison: Well, I love it. That’s a good segue. I’m curious if you were in a room right now with a bunch of high school girls that wanted to go into cybersecurity or more specifically into the CIA, it sounds like one piece of advice would be to figure out your comparative advantages, potentially. What else would you share in terms of advice?

Jennifer: It’s a good question. I actually had the opportunity a few months back. I spoke at an unusual cybersecurity conference and unusual in the sense that it was at a university and they invited a really large number of high school seniors to come explore careers in cybersecurity. And what I would try to tell people is to spend a little time and think about the broader issues at play in cybersecurity. There could be those who just like the technical challenge and that’s fantastic, right? I love that. That only takes you so far. And I think going back to something I’ve already said, figuring out what you want to accomplish in life. I don’t mean you have to know everything when you’re 18 years old, not that, but what matters to you? What’s important? How do you find a sense of purpose in what you do? Because of course you need a job, and of course you want to be paid for that job, but the thing that keeps you coming back every day, I mean it is work and there can be bad days and good days. There’s going to be challenges. The thing that keeps you coming back is if you are connected to some broader purpose. In my corny example, I really did grow up in a family where we valued service to our country, where we thought it was important to defend the United States, where you wanted to fight communism, all that kind of stuff. And without over-dramatizing it, there is a similar dynamic at play today between digital tech in open societies and digital tech in digital authoritarian countries. And there’s this whole competition playing out that is going to determine the future of humanity. And if one can stop for a moment and just think about that, most people, I think, in the United States would think: “oh, yeah, I can really get behind that”. That’s really important. I need to defend. If you’re interested in cybersecurity, fantastic. Then you’re on the front lines of that battle.

And so I would encourage people to think about what that purpose might be. I would encourage young people, women, young girls, to be a little bold. Be unconventional. Don’t worry. Of course, I grew up like every other teenage girl that wanted to be like other people. But if I look back, the people, the heroes, the heroines who really resonated with me were completely unconventional. They were bold, resilient, a little audacious, maybe a little controversial even. And those were the people, those were the women I thought about.

So if anybody’s looking for great books that they didn’t read when they were at school, one of them that really stayed with me was “West with the Night” by Beryl Markham. And Beryl Markham was the first person to fly westward across the Atlantic successfully. A lot of people tried and some had died in the process. Everyone thinks of Amelia Earhart, very intrepid, intelligent, compelling figure and she flew across the Atlantic East right, but West is much harder much, much harder. Earhart had had a team but Beryl Markham did it alone and westward and she was the first ever and she wrote about it in this book – that I should go back and read – but what I remember of it was just so compelling and I just thought man, what a badass, right? And something in me clicked. I’m like, yeah, you know, that’s what I want. That’s what I want. I didn’t end up doing that, but in my own way, I landed in a career that was unconventional and a little bold and on days maybe even a little bit dangerous.

And I would just challenge young women in a society that wants to cocoon them in bubble wrap to just take some chances and be bold and try something that you think might make you nervous, might be hard. That’s okay. Just get out there and do it.

Alison: I think that’s great advice for high school seniors that are contemplating what they want to be when they grow up, or at least where do I want to put some of my energy? Do you think organizations should encourage more participation from non-traditional groups?

Jennifer: I think there are a lot of things that can be done. And the CIA, for whatever its reputation may be, and we’re a democracy, people are going to have different views on it, and that’s fine. There are a lot of people in the United States who might not say that they support an intelligence service. It’s just a reality of the world that every country has one, and you need to know what your adversaries are trying to do to you. So there may be people out there who think they don’t really like the idea of an intelligence service and that’s okay. But I will say that despite the reputation, it is mostly about merit. And I started at a time when there were very, very few women. And then fast forward, and when I became Deputy Director for Digital Innovation, without going down a rabbit hole here, there are five directorates. Each one is headed by a deputy director. The five deputy directors basically run the CIA, and then you have a director. And so when I became deputy director of digital innovation, all five directorates were headed by women and the director was a woman. In fact, six of the top eight positions in the CIA were women.

And so, you know, it didn’t take me long to just pause and think, you know what? Wow, things change. Things can change. They do change. And I’ve always felt it’s my responsibility to, if I walked through a door, I need to keep it open and help others. But I never felt it was my job to give somebody a particular advantage. I wanted people to have the opportunity to compete.

And so a couple things I’m going to say about that. I saw moments when I felt that there should have been more women in, say, some group of leadership positions. And I was also in a position years ago where I oversaw selections for key leadership positions and found myself very disappointed a few times by how few women put themselves out there for the roles. And it’s a bit of a stereotype, I understand this, but it seems to hold true. If I have a job vacancy that says you must have these 10 skills and a man has two and a woman has eight, the woman won’t apply and the man will. And I know that’s a stereotype and I’m generalizing, but there’s something to that.

So I had to do the selection of some of the most coveted senior leadership roles and I was heading a panel to do so. I was in charge of that entire process. And one year, the deadline was passed and all the applications were in. And I looked around, I thought, wait a second, we have 10% of the applications for women for these key roles that are catalysts for something more in the future that are great jobs and they give you a leg up, right? And so the next year, when the same process came around, like I said, I never wanted to give anyone special advantage, it’s not about that, but I did start calling a bunch of people and just saying, did you see these vacancies? Have you ever thought of yourself as, in this case, a chief of station? Have you ever thought about applying? And by the way, I’m not calling to tell you that you would get a job. I’m just telling you that I’d love to see your name on the list. And just trying to encourage people to apply, it really does make a difference. It can make a big difference.

The other two things I will say, we did really, really well, as I used to put it, as an organization that represents the United States. I would love our organization to be representative of the United States. But, you know, we’re in digital tech, so we have to also deal with demographics in the US. What percentage of college graduates with technical degrees are, you know, various demographics? And we were very careful not to measure and hire by any of those demographics because you can’t in government. It’s not lawful. But I wanted to make sure that the pipeline had a really rich representation. And so, honestly giving applicants the opportunity in the interviews, in the recruiting fairs, and all of that to actually see that diversity in action, to see a group of recruiters who look like America, that actually made a difference. There’s a psychology in that where people walk into a room, it’s a job fair, and you come to a table and you’ve got say five or six people, and you look across the five or six people and you’re like, oh, I do kind of fit here. Right? That has an impact.

The other thing I will say though, because I’ve always had a bit of a difficult relationship with what we used to call agency resource groups, the groups representing the interests of certain demographics. And lots of large organizations have these. So maybe it may be based on a gender issue or race or something else. And at the same time, I always felt, like I said before, I wanted to open the door behind me and bring people. And so I had many opportunities to serve, as what we used to call, executive champion for these organizations. People would ask me, would you please serve as executive champion for this resource group? And I did. I served as an executive champion for three particular resource groups. I had the same conversation each time, which was that, you know, I’d love to, but I just have two requests. First is that whatever programming you offer, you know, if it’s a seminar or it’s a webinar or if it’s a job, it’s a career fair, whatever it is, it needs to be open to everyone in the organization and needs to uplift everyone.

And then two is, I will never say or do or tolerate, in any session, somebody suggesting that people in this group are victims in any way. I just don’t think that’s productive. And I said, if that’s okay with you, then I’m all in. I’ll do everything I can. And it was. So, and I know that may sound a little tough, but just growing up in CIA early in my career, of course there were women’s groups, it didn’t have the positive impact that I would have hoped and I was glad to see over the years that changed and it was really about providing resources and uplifting everyone. So I’ve always had this slightly, not difficult, but nuanced relationship with those efforts. And for me, what worked best was to try to uplift everyone, ensure that the programming was for everyone and to avoid falling into a pit where discussions were around how, all the different ways that I’m a victim as a woman.

Alison: That resonates with me too, because I feel like I’m oftentimes the only female in the room when we have external meetings. The other day I looked around and it was seven guys and me. And I always, I always want the opportunity to be in that room, but I 100% want to be in that room because I’m qualified, not just because I am the token female.

Jennifer: I had lots of unique experiences like that. Most of my career, I was the only woman in the room and one of my last assignments as a chief of station was in a country with a military junta so everyone was a general. They were all men. And in the 75 years that the CIA had a presence there, there had never been a woman in the role. And so it was just a fun experience for me. I just took it as my own challenge to convince them through my own actions and professionalism that, hey, guess what? A woman can do this. And by the way, when I leave, you’re gonna think that I’m better than any of them were. That was my goal.

Alison: Any final thoughts, closing remarks, tying back to Women’s Equality Day or words of wisdom or even a fun story? Because I know you’re full of them.

Jennifer: Oh, no, I don’t want to bore people with more stories. I just think for anyone who’s considering cybersecurity, if we want to go back to that in particular, I just think it’s a fantastic time, right? Because A, there’s such a need, and B, there’s so many different pathways to cybersecurity. And yes, there’s a more traditional one where I’m going to go to university, I’m going to get a degree in a relevant field, and then I’m going to study and get a certification. That’s great. Fantastic. And that’s today the typical way, and it’s a really wonderful one. I also know people who’ve come through many other different paths. So one of my friends who’s quite well known in cybersecurity circles has her own company. She came up through the intelligence world, working on insider threat issues and then built her own company and built her own skills. And I’m sort of in a perpetual state of self-education on all of these issues and I try my best. My sweet spot is sort of cyber security for the C-suite, so not the deeply technical piece, but really thinking about the strategy and the rest of it. But there’s so much out there, there’s so much opportunity. I would suggest for anyone who’s really interested, I guarantee wherever you are today, you can map a path. And it can be through self-study, it can be through online certifications, it can be through a traditional education process, it could be on the job training, it could be lots of different things. And maybe if I’m thinking about the future and building a really successful cybersecurity career for the future, somebody is eager to do that, I would invest a little extra time to develop some level of data fluency, to really start thinking about what is coming, it’s already here in some respects, but what’s coming is really that confluence of data science and cybersecurity, where the two are gonna have to be working hand in hand. And the people who will have the superpowers in the not-differentiated future and who’ll be leading in this field are gonna be those who understand data, AI, and cybersecurity. That’s the sweet spot, I think, for the future where women, men, anyone can really carve out an exciting and successful career.